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Chap te r  1
The economic crisis in Greece, Spain, and Italy
Tomasz Kubin
1.1 Introductory notes
The fall of the American investment bank, the Lehman Brothers, on 15 Sep-
tember 2008 marked the symbolic start of the economic crisis (the symptoms 
of which had already been observed earlier). The crisis is considered as the 
deepest and most prolonged since the so-called Great Depression of the 1930s. 
It affected primarily the USA and Europe and led to such problems as economic 
recession, an increase of public sector deficit, public debt, problems with private 
debt (both for natural and legal persons), an increase in unemployment, decrease 
of the average public wealth, etc.
The problems affect particular states in varying degrees. The length of time 
in which the particular states struggled (or keep struggling) with the afore-
mentioned issues varied. Also, the causes of the economic problems of the 
particular states, especially those affected by the crisis the most, were not the 
same — the crisis in the USA was somewhat of a catalyst which revealed, and 
probably also accelerated and magnified, the states’ specific faults, imbalances, 
tensions, etc.
The consequences of the crisis go far beyond a strictly economic frame-
work. They concern both theoretical matters (generally speaking mostly views 
on the role and importance of the state and its institutions on the functioning of 
the state), as well as the practical aspects of the functioning of states or interna-
tional organisations (such as the European Union or the International Monetary 
Fund). The political consequences of the economic crisis in three chosen states 
of the EU, namely, its impact on the shape and functioning of their political 
systems, are the main subject of this study and will be discussed in detail in its 
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subsequent parts. Apart from political consequences, the crisis and its aftermath 
led to the introduction of various economic reforms.
In the case of the said international organisations, it led to very considerable 
reforms in the functioning of the EU and the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), as well as to a further deepening of the level of integration between EU 
states.1 The crisis and the experiences resulting from the delivery of financial 
assistance programmes undertaken by the IMF, will certainly have a significant 
influence on the approach this organisation takes in the future with regard to 
such issues as prevention of economic crises, the drafting, implementation, and 
control of assistance programmes or the advisory activity of the IMF.
With regard to the states analysed, namely Greece, Spain, and Italy, among 
the causes of the crisis are those which were somewhat “external” in nature, 
that is, they were independent from the politics of these states or which had 
a very insignificant or indirect influence on its outbreak. They will be subject to 
a synthetic analysis in section 1.2 of the chapter. The second group of causes are 
those related to the functioning of Greece, Spain, and Italy in the EU, whereas 
the third group includes causes which are specific for a state and covers faults 
in its economic policies and state-specific macroeconomic imbalances. The cir-
cumstances and conditions that make up the last two groups of causes that con-
tributed to the crisis are very closely related and for this reason will be presented 
jointly. These issues will be dealt with in the second part of this chapter (section 
1.3). This part includes a series of different statistical data, which presents the 
economic manifestations and consequences of several years of crisis in Greece, 
Spain, and Italy. Presenting data only on the three states without comparing 
them with others, would not provide us with much information. That is why, as 
mentioned at the beginning, it is necessary to present this data alongside other 
EU states in order to better show and understand the effects of the crisis.
The economic consequences of the crisis, mainly in the case of Greece, 
were so severe that the country was not able to cope with them on its own 
and had to ask for assistance from international organisations and institutions. 
Spain received much less external assistance to this extent. The conditions of 
these programmes, control over their execution by EU institutions and the IMF, 
as well as the effects of the crisis meant that it became necessary to introduce 
a series of reforms aimed to reinstate economic balance and stability. The eco-
nomic actions undertaken in Greece, Spain, and in Italy in response to the crisis 
are the subject of section 1.4. Taking into account the relations between the 
economy and politics as defined at the beginning, the economic manifestations 
and consequences of the crisis in Greece, Spain, and in Italy constitute a start-
ing point for the presentation and analysis of their influence on the changes in 
 1 See for example T. Kubin: “Kryzys gospodarczy i zadłużeniowy a zróżnicowanie inte-
gracji w Unii Europejskiej.” Studia Europejskie 2012, vol. 3(63), pp. 71—92.
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the shape and functioning of the political systems in these countries, which will 
be discussed in the subsequent chapters.
1.2 General causes of the economic crisis of 2008
The economic crisis began in the USA and its direct cause was the burst 
of the speculation bubble on the property market in the country. The problems 
that led to the crisis had been increasing for several years2 and became appar-
ent in the years 2006—2007. The collapse of the mortgage loans market itself 
occured in August 2007.3 The literature of the subject speaks of the following 
causes of the crisis4:
• the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, which led to an excessive expan-
sion of loans and to the formation of the said speculative bubble on the US 
properties market5;
• banks’ (especially US banks’) persistence in maintaining high equity interest 
rates in conditions of low central bank interest rates6;
• the conviction of many politicians and economists that the economic cycles 
are a thing of the past and that central banks are able to prevent their negative 
consequences7;
• the widespread expectation of a further increase of asset prices (especially 
property)8;
 2 More on events relating to the crisis in 2007—2008, see for exemple W. nawroT: Glo-
balny kryzys finansowy XXI wieku. Przyczyny, przebieg, skutki, prognozy. Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 25—40.
 3 D. rosaTi: “Przyczyny i mechanizm kryzysu finansowego w USA.” Ekonomista 2009, 
no. 3, pp. 315.
 4 T. Kubin: Legitymizacja systemu instytucjonalnego Unii Europejskiej. Katowice 2014, 
pp. 380—383.
 5 Ch. GooDharT: “The financial crisis and the future of the financial system.” Zeszyty BRE 
Bank-CASE 2009, no. 100, pp. 10—21. The Fed’s monetary policy as a cause of the crisis is also 
mentioned by, for exemple, L. Balcerowicz and J. Osiatyński: “Tak poprawia się kapitalizm.” 
Interview with L. baLCerowiCz. Gazeta Wyborcza of 01.10.2008, p. 11; “Kryzys finansowy, czyli 
chwila prawdy.” Interview with L. baLCerowiCz. Gazeta Wyborcza of 10—11.11.2008, p. 28; 
“Zostawcie mój kapitalizm w spokoju.” Interview with L. baLCerowiCz. Gazeta Wyborcza of 
11.05.2009, p. 26; “Jak długo potrwa kryzys.” Interview with J. osiaTyńsKi. Gazeta Wyborcza of 
26.11.2008, p. 29.
 6 Ch. GooDharT: “The financial crisis…,” pp. 10—21.
 7 Ibidem, p. 13. More in for example P. KruGman: The return of depression economics and 
the crisis of 2008. New York—London 2009, pp. 9—29.
 8 Ch. GooDharT: “The financial crisis…,” pp. 10—21.
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• subprime loans in the USA9;
• excessive trust in the effectiveness and fluidity of markets10;
• a lack of proper tools in the hands of supervisory institutions that would help 
prevent problems from snowballing11;
• abolition in 1999 of the US Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the 
Glass-Steagall Act, named after their promoters, that is, senator Carter Glass 
and a member of the House of Representatives Henry B. Steagall.12 It was 
adopted during the Great Depression and forbade combining investment 
banking with deposit and loan banking. In 2010, the President of the USA 
Barack Obama signed a law referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act13 (from sena-
tor Chris Dodd and member of the House of Representatives Barney Frank), 
which again separated investment banking from retail banking;
• “failure to adjust the regulatory and supervisory systems and risk assessment 
methods to new events on the financial markets after 1998”14 — D. Rosati 
on the quick development of new financial instruments (derivatives) and the 
globalisation of markets15;
• “faulty corporate governance,”16 irregularities in the functioning of financial 
sector institutions,17 bankers’ and brokers’ remuneration programmes encour-
aging them to take excessive risks18 and a lack of accountability on the part 
of managers for their actions19;
 9 Ibidem; r. baLDwin, Ch. wyPLosz: The Economics of European Integration. Maidenhead 
2015, pp. 481—482.
 10 Ch. GooDharT: “The financial crisis…,” pp. 10—21.
 11 Ibidem. For more on the causes of the crisis, see also, for example, J. TayLor: Zrozumieć 
kryzys finansowy. Warszawa 2010.
 12 Public Law 73—66, 73d Congress, H.R. 5661: An act to provide for the safer and more 
effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion 
of funds into speculative operations [Banking Act 1933]. http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/histori 
cal/congressional/1933_bankingact_publiclaw66.pdf (retrieved: 6.10.2013).
 13 Public Law 111—203, 111th Congress, H.R. 4173: An act to promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
“too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes [Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform 
and consumer protection law]. http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf (accessed 
11.11.2013).
 14 D. rosaTi: “Przyczyny i mechanizm…,” p. 316.
 15 Ibidem.
 16 “Zarabianie jest moralne.” A conversation with e. PheLPs. Gazeta Wyborcza of 21.10.2013, 
p. 20.
 17 “Jak długo potrwa kryzys…,” p. 29.
 18 n. roubini, s. mihm: Ekonomia kryzysu. Warszawa 2011, p. 21.
 19 J. Kornai: “Widmo socjalizmu krąży nad światem?” Gazeta Wyborcza of 11—12.07.2009, 
pp. 23—24.
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• complicated financial innovations and conversion into bonds of subprime 
mortgage loans whose value was very difficult to estimate20;
• granting of mortgage loans under political pressure to people who were unable 
to pay them off21;
• increase of wealth disparities which led to a “quasi-stagnations of the purchas-
ing power of lower and middle classes”22 and caused an increase in people’s 
tendency to run into debt (at the same time, banks and financial brokers were 
very eager to hand out such loans)23;
• bad functioning of rating agencies24;
• financial co-dependency of deficit countries (mostly the USA, but also Great 
Britain, Spain, and Ireland) and countries with financial surpluses (China, 
West Germany, Japan, and oil-rich countries)25;
• structural increase of the level of capital in relation to the level of revenue 
(especially in Europe) accompanied by  the hypertrophy of gross financial 
asset positions between countries.26
It is also worth mentioning that according to some researchers, the crisis, 
that had come afloat in 2008, is not merely another dip in the economic cycle, 
but is “fundamental in nature” — “it is a systemic crisis of modern-day capital-
ism, or more specifically, of its neoliberal mutation, which had recently taken 
precedence in most of the world”27 and according to Grzegorz Kołodko, could 
emerge only “in conditions of the neoliberal Anglo-American model.”28
Taking into account the listed causes of the crisis, it is observed that in es-
sence, the discussion about its genesis fits into a debate which is key for politics, 
the economy, and economic policy, namely a debate on the optimum level of 
interference of state institutions in the free-market mechanism. The debate con-
cerns the issue of whether the interference is (or can be) effective and whether it 
 20 “Zostawcie mój kapitalizm…,” p. 26; “Banki pod spec nadzorem.” Interview with 
J. Lewan DowsKi. Gazeta Wyborcza of 29.06.2013, p. 9; “Zarabianie jest…,” p. 20.
 21 “Zostawcie mój kapitalizm…,” p. 26; “Banki pod spec…,” p. 9; “Zarabianie jest…,” p. 20.
 22 T. PiKeTTy: Kapitał w XXI wieku. Trans. A. biLiK. Warszawa 2015, p. 364.
 23 Ibidem, pp. 364—365.
 24 n. roubini, s. mihm: Ekonomia kryzysu…, pp. 84—91.
 25 J. KuLiG: “Współzależności globalne w przebiegu kryzysu finansowego.” In: Globalny 
kryzys finansowy a polska gospodarka. Ed. w. małeCKi. Warszawa 2009, pp. 44—46.
 26 T. PiKeTTy: Kapitał…, p. 366.
 27 G. KołoDKo: “Neoliberalizm i światowy kryzys gospodarczy.” Ekonomista 2010, no. 1, 
p. 119.
 28 Ibidem, p. 121. For more on the crisis, see also, for example: A. woJTyna: “Gospodarki 
wschodzące w obliczu kryzysu finansowego — duża odporność czy podatność?” In: Kryzys 
finansowy i jego skutki dla krajów na średnim poziomie rozwoju. Ed. a. woJTyna. Warszawa 
2011, pp. 14—28; w. szymańsKi: Kryzys globalny. Pierwsze przybliżenie. Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 13—118; w. orłowsKi: “The nature of the current crisis.” In: Financial crisis in Central 
and Eastern Europe: From similarity to diversity. Eds. G. GorzeLaK, Chor-ChinG Goh. Warsaw 
2010, pp. 9—16; D. rosaTi: “Przyczyny i mechanizm…,” pp. 348—349.
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is a rather positive (beneficial) phenomenon, or instead brings about more harm 
than good to the free market, but, despite its flaws, remains the best possible 
mechanism for the allocation of resources.
On the one hand, supporters of minimalistic interference of the state and its 
institutions in the economy claim that the main causes of the crisis lay in mis-
takes made by state institutions which had at times been politically motivated 
and by the interference of the state in market mechanisms. Had it not been for 
its interference and had the market been left alone, the crisis would not have 
occurred or it would have been less severe. Furthermore, “public institutions, 
namely governments, parliaments, central banks, had developed flawed frame-
works for the functioning of the financial sector.”29 On the other hand, those 
who believe that the state and its institutions should not resign from adjusting 
and influencing the market, emphasise that the crisis is the result of the exces-
sive withdrawal of political institutions from influencing the economy, their 
lack of tools to do so (either because they abandoned them or lost them), the 
innovation of the financial sector capable of circumventing restrictions imposed 
by various regulations, or irregularities and pathologies in the behaviour and 
actions of financial sector entities (institutions or even individuals). This dispute 
is ideological in nature and, as such, is unsolvable. It is, however, worth adding 
that according to, for instance, Thomas Piketty, the crisis did not end in such 
a deep recession as in 1929, mostly because public institutions performed their 
roles, that is, governments and central banks of wealthy states “this time pre-
vented the collapse of the financial system and agreed on creating the necessary 
fluidity,”30 which helped prevent banks from going bankrupt. Central banks, on 
the other hand, played the role of the last resort.31
1.3  Causes and economic manifestations of the crisis in 
Greece, Spain, and Italy
Close economic and financial interconnections and dependencies which ex-
ist in today’s world economy caused many of the economic problems that oc-
curred in the USA, to spread to other states. These states were primarily located 
in the EU and included, among others, Greece, Spain, and Italy. Apart from the 
general conditions outlined in the previous point, two other cause categories that 
apply to the EU include those related to membership in the Union, which covers 
 29 “Zostawcie mój kapitalizm…,” p. 27.
 30 T. PiKeTTy: Kapitał…, pp. 582—583.
 31 Ibidem, p. 583.
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both the economic and monetary union, and causes which are specific to each 
of these states. Of course, such a breakdown of causes is purely conventional, 
since a precise categorisation is impossible, especially given that all of them 
occurred simultaneously.
One of the greatest costs the states had to incur in exchange for abandon-
ing their currencies and adopting the euro was relinquishment of their power 
to manage their own monetary policies, influence the exchange rate of their 
currencies and adopt restrictions on the freedom to shape their budget policies. 
The single monetary policy for all of the euro area member states is managed 
by the ECB, which means, in theory, that at any given moment, particular policy 
decisions may not serve the best interests of every single state. The economic 
situation of states belonging to the EMU may drastically differ, even despite 
the legal regulations and actions of EU institutions and member states aimed 
to coordinate economic policies. As shown by the experience gained from the 
economic crisis, this is not only a theoretical possibility.
In turn, the lack of authority to influence the exchange rate by state insti-
tutions may, as proven several decades ago, have a negative influence on the 
regions (states) which are going through a dip in their economic condition.32 
The lack of capability to influence the currency exchange rate signifies a “shift 
of the economic burden of the adjustment process onto other macroeconomic 
variables, primarily onto employment and salaries.”33 A tool, which remains at 
the disposal of the state, is the fiscal policy.34 However, even here the freedom 
of member states is restricted by legal regulations applied by the EU (stability 
and growth pact).35 Apart from this, as the crisis has shown, whenever any of 
the EU states decided to depart from the rules imposed by the pact in order to 
restore these freedoms, they would experience an excessive increase of debt and 
problems with its repayment.
Public debt. One of the greatest economic problems that arose during the 
crisis among EU states, one that was most pronounced in Greece, was the issue 
of public debt. The roots of the problem run deep and the economic crisis was 
a factor that highlighted its scale and greatly contributed to its exacerbation. 
 32 G. maGnifiCo: European Monetary Unification. London 1973, p. 2.
 33 L. oręziaK: Integracja walutowa w ramach Europejskiej Wspólnoty Gospodarczej. 
Warszawa 1991, p. 9; w. moLLe: Ekonomika integracji europejskiej. Teoria, praktyka, polityka. 
Gdańsk 1995, pp. 397—398; h.m. Kaufmann: “European economic and monetary union: Pros-
pects and pitfalls — is EMU premature?” In: The European Union in a changing world. A selec-
tion of conference papers, Brussels 19—20 September 1996. Luxembourg 1998, p. 171.
 34 P. Kenen: Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. Moving beyond Maastricht. Cam-
bridge 1996, p. 81.
 35 More on the influence of membership in the EMU on the independance of the economic 
policy of a state see: T. Kubin: Polityczne implikacje wprowadzenia unii walutowej w Europie. 
Katowice 2007, pp. 177—198.
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Generally speaking, debt is the result of public spending that exceeds the state’s 
revenue levels. This situation had been prevalent in EU states for a very long 
time. One of the reasons behind this was the unwillingness on the part of the 
ruling politicians to reduce the public sector deficit, their succumbing to pres-
sure from society or from various interest groups to increase various privileges, 
deductions, benefits, etc., or at least not to decrease them (resulting in their in-
creased political support), unwillingness and consistency in limiting the extent 
of the grey market and in collecting taxes, or maintaining economic develop-
ment through public investment financed through loans. Another circumstance 
which had a negative impact on public finances was a low birth rate, increased 
life expectancy and the aging of society, resulting in increased retirement ex-
penses that played a key role in Greece’s public debt crisis.36 What is more, there 
was a wide disparity between the contributions paid into the retirement system 
and the pensions eventually paid out.37
The regulations that were adopted in the EU following the introduction of 
the monetary unions were supposed to prevent the particular states of the EMU 
from becoming excessively indebted. However, the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community (TEC), based on which the EMU was established, contained 
a provision, which allowed countries into the EMU, whose public debt in relation 
to its GDP exceeded the reference value of 60% as indicated in the appendix 
to the Treaty.38 Article 104c, paragraph 2 of the TEC (in the version following 
the Maastricht Treaty — TM) stated that in order to become a member of the 
EMU, the public debt-to-GDP ratio could not exceed this reference value, “un-
less the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at 
a satisfactory pace.”39 As a result, states with the following debt-to-GDP ratios at 
admission40 were taken into the EMU: Belgium 122.2%, Italy 121.6%,41 Greece 
103.4%, the Netherlands 72.1%, Spain 68.8%, Ireland 66.3%, Austria 66.1%, 
 36 T. GruszeCKi: Świat na długu. Lublin 2012, p. 288.
 37 P. KuPisz: “Kryzys w Grecji — geneza, przebieg i konsekwencje.” In: Kryzys i per-
spektywy strefy euro. Eds. J. rymarCzyK, m. wróbLewsKi, D. brzęCzeK-nesTer. Wrocław 2014, 
pp. 128—129.
 38 Treaty on European Union. Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure. Official Journal 
C 191, 29.07.1992.
 39 Treaty on European Union. Official Journal C 191, 29.07.1992.
 40 Council Decision of 3 May 1998 in accordance with Article 109j(4) of the Treaty (98/317/
EC). Official Journal of the European Communities, L 139, 11.05.1998. Council Decision of 19 
June 2000 in accordance with Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the adoption by Greece of the sin-
gle currency on 1 January 2001 (2000/427/EC). Official Journal of the European Communities 
L 167, 7.07.2000.
 41 Italy’s public debt began to grow in 1964, when public spending surged. Attempts to 
repair the Italian public finances system were made several times in the 20th century, especially 
in the 1990s in order to fulfill the convergence criteria and enter the monetary union. See: 
s. miKLaszewiCz: Deficyt budżetowy w krajach strefy euro. Warszawa 2012, pp. 208—209.
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Portugal 62%, Germany 61.3%. Therefore, had it not been for article 104c, para-
graph 2 of the TEC that was adopted for political reasons in order not to exclude 
from the EMU some states with excessive debt, or if the permissible public debt 
level was only slightly higher than 60% GDP, but was strictly observed, then 
the issue of EU states’ debt (or the debt of euro area states) would be smaller 
during the economic crisis. It is noted that when comparing the aforementioned 
data with the debt levels of EU states from when the crisis began (Table 1.1) we 
can see that in the case of Greece, its debt was even greater than when it was 
admitted to the EMU. This means that on average, in the entire period from the 
decision to qualify EU states to the monetary union until the outbreak of the 
crisis, public debt did not decrease and did not approach the reference value, as 
required by the aforementioned article 104c, paragraph 2 of the TEC. On the 
contrary, public debt was rising.
Data showing public debt among EU states in the years 2007—2015 is con-
tained in Table 1.1. In 2015, this debt was clearly higher in all EU states without 
exception compared to the period from before the crisis. In relation to the GDP, 
Greece had the highest debt out of all the EU states in 2015. Greek public debt 
was the highest in the EU before the crisis (over 103% GDP) and in the recent 
years it increased to around 180% GDP. It is also worth noting that in the case 
of several EU states, between 2007 and 2015, the increase of public debt-to-GDP 
ratio was double that or even more (Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Great Britain).
Ta b l e  1.1
Public debt of EU states in 2007—2015 (in % GDP)
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 27 57.9 61.0 73.1 78.5 81.1 83.8 85.5 86.8 85.2
EU 28 57.8 60.9 73.1 78.5 81.0 83.8 85.5 86.8 85.2
Austria 64.8 68.5 79.7 82.4 82.2 81.6 80.8 84.3 86.2
Belgium 87.0 92.5 99.6 99.7 102.3 104.1 105.2 106.5 106.0
Bulgaria 16.2 13.0 13.7 15.5 15.3 16.8 17.1 27.0 26.7
Croatia 37.7 39.6 49.0 58.3 65.2 70.7 82.2 86.5 86.7
Cyprus 53.9 45.1 53.9 56.3 65.8 79.3 102.5 108.2 108.9
Czech Republic 27.8 28.7 34.1 38.2 39.9 44.7 45.1 42.7 41.1
Denmark 27.3 33.4 40.4 42.9 46.4 45.2 44.7 44.8 40.2
Estonia 3.7 4.5 7.0 6.6 5.9 9.5 9.9 10.4 9.7
Finland 34.0 32.7 41.7 47.1 48.5 52.9 55.5 59.3 63.1
France 64.4 68.1 79.0 81.7 85.2 89.6 92.4 95.4 95.8
Greece 103.1 109.4 126.7 146.2 172.1 159.6 177.7 180.1 176.9
Spain 35.5 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.5 85.4 93.7 99.3 99.2
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The Netherlands 42.4 54.5 56.5 59.0 61.7 66.4 67.9 68.2 65.1
Ireland 23.9 42.4 61.8 86.8 109.1 120.1 120.0 107.5 93.8
Lithuania 15.9 14.6 29.0 36.2 37.2 39.8 38.8 40.7 42.7
Luxembourg 7.8 15.1 16.0 20.1 19.1 22.0 23.3 22.9 21.4
Latvia 8.4 18.7 36.6 47.5 42.8 41.4 39.1 40.8 36.4
Malta 62.4 62.7 67.8 67.6 69.9 67.5 68.6 67.1 63.9
Germany 63.5 64.9 72.4 81.0 78.3 79.6 77.2 74.7 71.2
Poland 44.2 46.6 49.8 53.3 54.4 54.0 56.0 50.5 51.3
Portugal 68.4 71.7 83.6 96.2 111.4 126.2 129.0 130.2 129.0
Romania 12.7 13.2 23.2 29.9 34.2 37.4 38.0 39.8 38.4
Slovakia 29.9 28.2 36.0 40.8 43.3 52.4 55.0 53.9 52.9
Slovenia 22.8 21.8 34.6 38.4 46.6 53.9 70.0 81.0 83.2
Sweden 38.3 36.8 40.4 37.6 36.9 37.2 39.8 44.8 43.4
Great Britian 43.5 51.7 65.7 76.6 81.8 85.3 86.2 88.2 89.2
Hungary 65.6 71.6 78.0 80.6 80.8 78.3 76.8 76.2 75.3
Italy 99.8 102.4 112.5 115.4 116.5 123.3 129.0 132.5 132.7
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde410&plugin=1 (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
As far as Spain in concerned, it is noted that before the crisis, its public 
debt was clearly lower than at admission to the third stage of the EMU. This 
was the result of the conducted reforms and the good economic situation of the 
country before the crisis erupted. It is said that the macroeconomic reforms car-
ried out in Spain in the 1990s42 that aimed to fulfil the convergence criteria, “not 
only brought stability to the public finances system, but also established strong 
foundations of sustainable consolidation and economic revival.”43 The period 
from 1997—2007 in Spain was referred to as the “golden decade.”44 An almost 
threefold debt increase in Spain after 2007 was, as is stated, the consequence 
of bailouts in the private sector, with most of them going to the financial sec-
tor. Another reason was the state’s buying out of private sector debt.45 This, in 
 42 Ibidem, pp. 194—197.
 43 Ibidem, p. 196.
 44 m. GoLańsKa-PłuCienniK: “Kryzys w Hiszpanii.” In: Kryzys i perspektywy strefy euro. 
Eds. J. rymarCzyK, m. wróbLewsKi, D. brzęCzeK-nesTer. Wrocław 2014, p. 144.
 45 T. GruszeCKi: Świat na długu…, p. 75; S. owsiaK: “Wpływ kryzysu finansowego na 
wydatki publiczne.” In: Finanse publiczne a kryzys ekonomiczny. Eds. a. aLińsKa, b. PieTrzaK. 
Warszawa 2011, p. 74.
Table 1.1 continued
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particular, concerned credit unions, the functioning of which was not regulated 
as strictly as in the case of banks.46
Public finances sector deficit. An increase in public debt is mainly the 
result of the chronic deficit in the public finances sector. The rapid collapse 
of the economic situation after 2008 led to an increase of the public finances 
sector deficits in all of the EU states (Table 1.2). The years 2009—2010 were 
the worst in this respect. Starting in 2011, a certain improvement was observed 
throughout the EU, however, the situation in several EU states remains dif-
ficult in this regard, and their public sector deficits clearly exceed 3% GDP, 
which, according to EU law, is considered as excessive beyond this value. As 
far as the states discussed in this study are concerned, it is clear that Greece 
has the highest recorded public sector deficit. It is worth noting that Greece 
had already experienced a high deficit in 2007 (6.7% GDP), that is, before the 
crisis — which is shown in Table 1.8. Such a high deficit of the public finances 
sector occurred in Greece despite a GDP growth of 3.3%. For four consecutive 
years (2009—2012), a public sector deficit of 10% GDP was also recorded in 
Spain. Italy was in a relatively better situation. Its deficit in 2009 was 5.3% GDP, 
whereas from 2012 onwards, it oscillated around 3% GDP.
Ta b l e  1.2
Deficit/surplus of the public finances sector in EU states in the years 2007—2015 (in % GDP)
State/UE 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 27 –0.9 –2.4 –6.7 –6.4 –4.5 –4.3 –3.3 –3.0 –2.4
EU 28 –0.9 –2.5 –6.7 –6.4 –4.5 –4.3 –3.3 –3.0 –2.4
Austria –1.3 –1.4 –5.3 –4.4 –2.6 –2.2 –1.3 –2.7 –1.2
Belgium 0.1 –1.1 –5.4 –4.0 –4.1 –4.2 –3.0 –3.1 –2.6
Bulgaria 1.1 1.6 –4.1 –3.2 –2.0 –0.3 –0.4 –5.4 –2.1
Croatia –2.4 –2.8 –6.0 –6.2 –7.8 –5.3 –5.3 –5.5 –3.2
Cyprus 3.2 0.9 –5.5 –4.8 –5.7 –5.8 –4.9 –8.9 –1.0
Czech Republic –0.7 –2.1 –5.5 –4.4 –2.7 –3.9 –1.3 –1.9 –0.4
Denmark 5.0 3.2 –2.8 –2.7 –2.1 –3.5 –1.1 1.5 –2.1
Estonia 2.7 –2.7 –2.2 0.2 1.2 –0.3 –0.2 0.8 0.4
Finland 5.1 4.2 –2.5 –2.6 –1.0 –2.2 –2.6 –3.2 –2.7
France –2.5 –3.2 –7.2 –6.8 –5.1 –4.8 –4.0 –4.0 –3.5
Greece –6.7 –10.2 –15.2 –11.2 –10.2 –8.8 –13.0 –3.6 –7.2
Spain 2.0 –4.4 –11.0 –9.4 –9.6 –10.4 –6.9 –5.9 –5.1
The Netherlands 0.2 0.2 –5.4 –5.0 –4.3 –3.9 –2.4 –2.4 –1.8
 46 m. szuDy: “Polityka fiskalna Hiszpanii w warunkach kryzysu ekonomicznego 2008+.” 
In: Finanse publiczne. Prace naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu. Eds. 
J. soKołowsKi, m. sosnowsKi, a. ŻabińsKi. Wrocław 2012, pp. 371—372.
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Ireland 0.3 –7.0 –13.8 –32.3 –12.6 –8.0 –5.7 –3.8 –2.3
Lithuania –0.8 –3.1 –9.1 –6.9 –8.9 –3.1 –2.6 –0.7 –0.2
Luxembourg 4.2 3.4 –0.7 –0.7 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.7 1.2
Latvia –0.7 –4.1 –9.1 –8.5 –3.4 –0.8 –0.9 –1.6 –1.3
Malta –2.3 –4.2 –3.3 –3.2 –2.6 –3.5 –2.6 –2.0 –1.5
Germany 0.2 –0.2 –3.2 –4.2 –1.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.7
Poland –1.9 –3.6 –7.3 –7.5 –4.9 –3.7 –4.0 –3.3 –2.6
Portugal –3.0 –3.8 –9.8 –11.2 –7.4 –5.7 –4.8 –7.2 –4.4
Romania –2.8 –5.5 –9.5 –6.9 –5.4 –3.7 –2.1 –0.9 –0.7
Slovakia –1.9 –2.3 –7.9 –7.5 –4.1 –4.3 –2.7 –2.7 –3.0
Slovenia –0.1 –1.4 –5.9 –5.6 –6.7 –4.1 –15.0 –5.0 –2.9
Sweden 3.3 2.0 –0.7 0.0 –0.1 –0.9 –1.4 –1.6 0.0
Great Britian –3.0 –5.0 –10.7 –9.6 –7.7 –8.3 –5.6 –5.6 –4.4
Hungary –5.1 –3.6 –4.6 –4.5 –5.5 –2.3 –2.6 –2.3 –2.0
Italy –1.5 –2.7 –5.3 –4.2 –3.5 –2.9 –2.9 –3.0 –2.6
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00127&plugin=1 (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
Stability and growth pact. In order to prevent excessive public sector defi-
cit, the EU introduced legal regulations that eventually came to form the stabil-
ity and growth pact (SGP).47 The pact made it possible to oversee the economic 
policies of EU states and, at least in theory, to impose sanctions, including 
fines, for exceeding the 3% GDP threshold deficit in the public finances sector. 
However, in 2005, the provisions of the SGP were eased,48 and the sanctioning 
of states that exceeded the threshold became even more difficult.49 First of all, 
the SGP was not followed. Even though an exceeded deficit was identified in 
 47 Two regulations made up the stability and growth pact: Council Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies. Official Journal of the European Commu-
nities. L 209, 2.08.1997 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 209, 2.08.1997 and EC resolution of 17.06.1997 (Resolution of the 
European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact. Amsterdam, 17 June 1997. Official Journal 
of the European Communities C 236, 2.08.1997).
 48 Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/1997 on the strenghtening of the surveillance of the budgetary positions and the sur-
veillance and coordination of economic policies. Official Journal of the European Union L 174, 
7.07.2005 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure. Official Journal of the European Union L 174, 7.07.2005.
 49 See also: T. Kubin: “Polityczne implikacje…,” p. 148.
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EU states by the UE Council 38 times in the period from 1999 until 2015,50 no 
financial sanctions were ever imposed. Considering the fact that the excessive 
deficit procedure has been in place for several years (and in some cases even 
for ca. 10 years), and given that it was initiated twice in many EU states (even 
three times in Malta), it is noted that excessive public deficit, as understood by 
the TFEU (previously the TEEC), the public finance sector deficit was and is 
more of a norm than an exception. Excessive deficit was also noted twice by 
the Council with regard to Greece and Italy and once with regard to Spain. All 
three states exceeded their deficits in 2009, which was one of the effects of 
the financial crisis. Earlier, Greece exceeded its deficit in 2004, while Italy in 
2005. With regard to Greece and Spain, the excessive deficit procedure is still 
underway and the current deadline for its reduction is 2016. Selected facts on 
the procedure initiated against Greece, Spain, and Italy contained in Table 1.3.
Ta b l e  1.3
Excessive deficit procedure initiated against Greece, Spain, and Italy
State Key facts concerning the excessive deficit procedure Date
Current deadline for excessive deficit reduction — 2016
Greece Council decision giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit 
reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit
19.08.2015
Council decision instructing Greece to strengthen and deepen actions 
aimed at reducing its deficit (amended subsequently on 8 November 2011, 
13 March 2012, and 4 December 2012)
12.07.2011
Council decision instructing Greece to strengthen and deepen actions 
aimed at reducing its deficit (amended subsequently on 7 September 2010 
and 7 March 2011)
10.05.2010
Council decision stating that Greece did not introduce effective actions in 
response to the Council’s recommendations of 27 April 2009
2.12.2009
Council recommendation to Greece, for its authorities to reduce excessive 
budget deficit by 2010
27.04.2009
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 27.04.2009
EC recommendation to the Council to take a decision on the occurrence 
of excessive deficit
24.03.2009
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 24.03.2009
EC report on the budget situation 18.02.2009
Council decision abrogating the decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 05.06.2005
EC recommendation to the Council to repeal the decision on excessive 
deficit
16.05.2005
Council decision addressed to Greece informing it about the need to un-
dertake actions aiming to reduce the deficit
17.02.2005
 50 “Economic and Financial Affairs, The corrective arm,” http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fina 
nce/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm (retrieved: 20.10.2013).
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EC recommendation to the Council on taking a decision to inform Greece 
about the need for its authorities to take actions aiming to reduce the deficit
9.02.2005
Council decision stating that Greece did not introduce effective actions in 
response to the Council’s recommendations of 5 July 2004
18.01.2005
EC recommendation to the Council on taking a decision on actions intro-
duced by Greece in response to excessive deficit
22.12.2004
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 5.07.2004
EC recommendation to the Council to take a decision on the occurrence 
of excessive deficit
24.06.2004
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 24.06.2004
EC report on the budget situation 19.05.2004
Current deadline for excessive deficit reduction — 2018
Spain Council decision giving notice to Spain to take measures for the deficit re-
duction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit
8.08.2016
Council decision establishing that no effective action has been taken by 
Spain in response to the Council Recommendation of 21 June 2013
12.07.2016
Council opinion on the Economic Partnership Programme 10.12.2013
Presentation by Spain of the Economic Partnership Programme and a Re-
port on actions regarding economic policy
1.10.2013
Council recommendation concerning Spain for its authorities to reduce 
excessive budget deficit by 2016
21.06.2013
Reiterated Council recommendation concerning Spain for its authorities 
to reduce excessive budget deficit by 2014
10.07.2012
Council recommendation concerning Spain for its authorities to reduce 
excessive budget deficit by 2014
2.12.2009
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 27.04.2009
EC recommendation to the Council to take a decision on the occurrence 
of excessive deficit
24.03.2009
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 24.03.2009
EC report on the budget situation 18.02.2009
Italy Council decision abrogating the decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 21.06.2013
EC recommendation to the Council to repeal the decision on excessive deficit 29.05.2013
EC communication to the Council on actions taken by Italy with regard 
to the occurrence of excessive deficit
15.06.2010
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 2.12.2009
EC recommendation to the Council to take a decision on the occurrence 
of excessive deficit
11.11.2009
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 11.11.2009
EC report on the budget situation 7.10.2009
Council decision abrogating the decision on the occurrence of excessive 
deficit
3.06.2008
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EC recommendation to the Council to abrogate the decision on excessive 
deficit
7.05.2008
EC communication to the Council on actions taken by Italy with regard 
to the occurrence of excessive deficit
22.02.2006
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 28.07.2005
EC recommendation to the Council to take a decision on the occurrence 
of excessive deficit
29.06.2005
Council decision on the occurrence of excessive deficit 29.06.2005
EC report on the budget situation 7.06.2005
Council decision to close the early warning procedure 5.07.2004
EC recommendation to the Council to issue and early warning to prevent 
the occurrence of excessive deficit
28.04.2004
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/greece_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/spain_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/italy_en.htm (retrieved: 
15.11.2016).
It is also worth noting that the Greek authorities sent UE institutions sta-
tistical information, which were untrue and did not reflect the real situation of 
its public finances. The fact that Greece had been falsifying its statistics (based 
on which it was admitted to the euro area) was known at least since December 
2004.51 Despite the fact that several years had passed from the moment this fact 
surfaced until Greece began experiencing problems in 2009—2010, neither EU 
institutions, nor member states took any concrete actions to address this issue. 
Sanctions for providing false statistical data were not imposed until 2011, when 
a regulation of the EU Parliament and Council (1173/201152) was passed. The 
regulation was introduced in the framework of the so-called Sixpack, that is, six 
legal acts introduced in 2011 aiming to reform the SGP.
Fall of interest rates. As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main 
causes of the crisis in the USA was the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve 
and maintaining excessively low interest rates for too long. For several EU states, 
especially for Greece, but also for Spain and Italy, a similar circumstance played 
a key role. After the introduction of the euro, the signatory states of the SGP 
harmonised their interest rates (both nominal and real interest rates53) and nearly 
 51 r. sołTyK: “Europrzekręt.” Gazeta Wyborcza of 2.12.2004, p. 25.
 52 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 No-
vember 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area. Official 
Journal of the European Union L 306, 23.11.2011.
 53 J. PieTruCha: “Kryzys w strefie euro jako tło zmian w zarządzaniu gospodarczym.” In: 
Zarządzanie gospodarcze w strefie euro. Eds. J. PieTruCha, J. ŻabińsKa. Warszawa 2014, p. 16.
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equalised the yield values of debt securities issued by the euro area countries. 
As the subsequent events showed, the financial markets failed to adequately 
differentiate the particular states of the monetary union based on the condition 
of their public finances, and the difference in debt security yields were lower 
than the states’ actual economic situation would suggest. It later turned out that 
a state’s membership in the euro area was perceived too much as a marker of 
its credibility and solvency. Such indicators as public and private debt, the situ-
ation of the public finances sector, economic growth rate, or competitiveness, 
on the other hand, played a smaller role. As a result, differences in the yields 
of debt securities issued by the particular euro area states were relatively low, 
as shown by the level of risk in case of an issuer’s potential insolvency. One of 
the results of this state of affairs was that for such countries as Greece, Spain, 
and Italy (and also Portugal), it became relatively cheaper to borrow than before 
the introduction of the monetary union. What is more, a higher inflation rate 
in the so-called periphery states of the euro area (which also included Greece 
and Spain) in relation to the other EU states belonging to the monetary union 
resulted in lower real interest rates.54 This resulted in the mentioned increase, 
instead of a decrease, of public debt.
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Chart 1.1. Long-term governmental debt security yields (as a criterion defined in the Maastricht 
Treaty; annual average values) in selected EU states in the years 2006—2015
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00097&plugin=1 (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
 54 Ibidem.
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Starting in the period 2008—2009, the situation changed dramatically and 
financial market institutions became aware of the differences amongst euro area 
states with regard to their risk of insolvency and that the EMU does not provide 
a mechanism guaranteeing that money borrowed by the states belonging to the 
monetary union will be returned in time. The crisis led to a different treatment 
of the particular states, and differences in their economic situations were taken 
more carefully into account. As a result, debt security yields of states with the 
highest debts and with the worst macroeconomic conditions increased markedly. 
The yields of long-term debt securities issued by selected EU states in the years 
2006—2015 are shown in Chart 1.1.
The increase in Greek security bond yields, which is clearly visible in Fig-
ure 1.1, meant the country could no longer borrow from the market due to the 
securities’ excessive interest rates. On the other hand, as observed in the case of 
Germany, which is presented here for comparative reasons, the borrowing costs 
for this country fell after the crisis, which is surely one of the more significant 
reasons why German politicians were unwilling to issue euro bonds.
Creditworthiness. Apart from debt security yields, another indicator pre-
senting the creditworthiness of a debtor is a state’s credit rating. Setting aside 
the issue of the credibility and reliability of credit rating agencies signalled in 
section 1.2 it is true that the ratings they announce play an important role in 
determining a state’s borrowing capabilities and the loan costs. The downturn in 
the economic position of Greece, Spain, and Italy indicated earlier was clearly 
reflected in their ratings. This is presented in Table 1.4, which contains long-
term credit ratings issued by three main rating agencies covering the period 
from the introduction of the third stage of the EMU until recently.
Ta b l e  1.4
Long-term credit ratings of Greece, Spain, and Italy
issued by Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s and Fitch Ratings rating agencies in the years 1999—2016
(selected dates, foreign currency)
Greece Spain Italy
Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody’s S&P Fitch
2015-07-01
Caa3
2016-01-22
B–
2015-08-18
CCC
2014-02-21
Baa2
2015-10-02
BBB+
2014-04-25
BBB+
2012-07-13
Baa2
2014-12-05
BBB–
2013-03-08
BBB+
2015-04-29
Caa2
2015-07-21
CCC+
2015-06-30
CC
2012-06-13
Baa3
2014-05-23
BBB
2012-06-07
BBB
2012-02-13
A3
2013-07-09
BBB
2012-01-27
A–
2014-08-01
Caa1
2015-06-29
CCC–
2015-03-27
CCC
2012-02-13
A3
2012-10-10
BBB–
2012-01-27
A
2011-10-04
A2
2012-01-13
BBB+
2011-10-12
A+
2013-11-29
Caa3
2015-06-10
CCC
2014-05-23
B
2011-10-18
A1
2012-04-26
BBB+
2011-10-07
AA–
2002-05-15
Aa2
2011-09-19
A
2006-10-19
AA–
2012-03-02
C
2015-04-15
CCC+
2013-05-14
B–
2011-03-10
Aa2
2012-01-13
A
2010-05-28
AA+
2002-06-17
AA
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2011-07-25
Ca
2015-02-06
B–
2012-05-17
CCC
2010-09-30
Aa1
2011-10-13
AA–
2003-12-10
AAA
2011-06-01
Caa1
2014-09-12
B
2012-03-14
B–
2001-12-13
Aaa
2010-04-28
AA
2011-03-07
B1
2012-12-18
B–
2012-03-09
RD
2010-06-14
Ba1
2012-12-05
SD
2012-02-22
C
2010-04-22
A3
2012-05-02
CCC
2011-07-13
CCC
2009-12-22
A2
2012-02-27
SD
2011-05-20
B+
2002-11-04
A1
2011-07-27
CC
2011-01-14
BB+
1999-07-14
A2
2010-04-09
BBB–
2009-12-08
BBB+
2009-10-22
A–
2004-12-16
A
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on: http://countryeconomy.com/ratings/greece,  http://countryecono 
my.com/ratings/spain, http://countryeconomy.com/ratings/italy (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
The summary shows very clearly how much the economic crisis and public 
finance issues contributed to the decrease of the creditworthiness of Greece, 
Spain, and Italy. It is worth to point out here that there is always a close corre-
lation and interdependence between the condition of the public finance system, 
yields on governmental debt securities and rating agency scores. This is to say 
that an increase of deficit and the deterioration of public finances increases 
loan demand and the loan costs, which even further deepens issues with public 
finances and subsequently leads to a decrease of ratings, which for lenders is 
a reason to demand higher interest rates, etc. due to the increased risk.
Private debt. Apart from public debt, another indicator shedding light on 
a state’s economic situation is the debt of private entities. Proceeding economic 
integration in the framework of the EU communities and development of a sin-
gle market that led, among others, to the free movement of capital, and to the 
monetary union, provided better access to financing in the international market. 
For Greece and Spain, this also meant a significant inflow of foreign capital, 
especially in the form of interbank loans. The banks in these countries acquired 
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access to capital, which resulted in loan values becoming independent from the 
accumulated deposits and an increase in loan supply.55
Ta b l e  1.5
Net loan supply in the private sector 
(non-financial corporations,  households, non-profit institutions) 
in Greece, Spain, and in Italy in the  years 1995—2015 (in % GDP)
Year Greece Spain Italy Year Greece Spain Italy
1995 1.5 3.5 4.5 2006 16.3 35.0 10.4
1996 5.3 5.1 2.3 2007 16.2 26.4 12.0
1997 3.3 7.8 2.7 2008 15.6 11.7 6.6
1998 6.7 12.2 4.0 2009 2.4 –1.2 0.8
1999 6.2 15.0 8.2 2010 5.6 0.9 5.0
2000 10.5 17.1 8.8 2011 –6.5 –3.7 3.1
2001 11.0 14.6 8.3 2012 –5.7 –11.2 –0.8
2002 8.0 14.8 6.3 2013 –6.2 –10.3 –2.7
2003 10.4 18.1 6.9 2014 –2.7 –7.4 –0.9
2004 11.4 19.4 7.5 2015 –3.2 –2.7 n/a
2005 14.3 27.0 9.6
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tipspc20&plugin=1 (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
Data showing net loan supply in the private sector in Greece, Spain and in 
Italy in the years 1995—2015 (in % GDP) is contained in Table 1.5. The increase 
in supply in these states is clearly visible the moment the monetary union was 
opened. Loan supply in the private sector rose in the year immediately pre-
ceding the crisis, and was most notable in Spain. According to the literature, 
private debt increase resulted mainly in the development of construction and 
of the so-called speculative bubble in the real-estate market. Before the crisis 
in 2008, Spain experienced the greatest speculative activity in the real-estate 
market right after the USA.56 Easier access to loans and its lower price led to 
an increase in property demand causing property prices to rise, which further 
fuelled loan demand.57 The real-estate and construction sectors were the main 
drivers of economic growth before 2007. This situation was the effect of the 
aforementioned loan cost decrease caused by entering the euro area, rise of 
property demand due to demographic processes (demand for property by baby 
boomers, immigration to Spain and the demand generated by the citizens of 
other EU states, especially from Northern Europe and Great Britain) and liber-
 55 Ibidem, pp. 16—17.
 56 S. OwSiak: “Wpływ kryzysu…,” p. 74.
 57 J. Pietrucha: “Kryzys w strefie euro…,” p. 19.
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alisation of the law on construction land, which meant an increase of accessibil-
ity of this kind of land (which occurred in 2003).58
The increase of demand for property led to an obvious rise in its supply and 
prices (in 1997—2007 house prices increased year-to-year by 11.4% on average, 
which meant an aggregate price increase of 232%59). The lending activity of 
Spanish banks was mostly financed by external capital — when the effects of 
the crisis in the USA started to be felt in Europe’s banking sector, the reduc-
tion in external financing for Spanish banks led to a deceleration of lending 
activity and an increase of mortgage interest rates. This resulted in a decrease 
of demand for these kinds of loans and for property, which caused a slowdown 
of the construction industry. The banking sector also suffered because of this.60
The data presented in Table 1.5 clearly show a decrease of loan supply in 
the private sector starting in 2009, which, on the one hand, was caused by the 
crisis, while on the other hand, contributed to the occurrence and deepening of 
a series of other negative phenomena, such a economic recession and increased 
unemployment.
Also in Italy, the increase in lending in the first decade of the 21st century 
led to “an illusion of economic growth” and when it deteriorated after the erup-
tion of the crisis in the USA, “it turned out that many projects financed by banks 
were unprofitable.”61 In the years 2000—2008, property prices rose in Italy by 
85% (53% considering the inflation rate) and have been falling ever since. De-
spite the fact that the extent of the lending activity on the property market was 
not that extensive as in other EU states, it slowed down economic activity, which 
in turn resulted in less profits earned by the Italian budget.62 Another source 
of problems for Italian banks was the outflow of deposits caused by decreased 
investor confidence in the banking system; the problem also concerned Greece 
and Spain.63
Table 1.6 contains data on the global debt of the private sector in particular 
EU states in the years 1995—2015 (in % GDP). This data suggests that even 
a relatively high level of private debt does not have to lead to a crisis, at least 
in the short-term. It is also observed that almost all EU states over the least two 
decades have experienced a marked increase of private debt, which was several-
fold at times. Greece, Spain, and Italy were part of this trend. Private debt has 
 58 m. GoLańsKa-PłuCienniK: “Kryzys w Hiszpanii…,” pp. 145—146.
 59 C. CuerPo, P. PonTuCh: “Spanish housing market: adjustment and implications.” ECFIN 
Country Focus, vol. 10, issue 8, December 2013, p. 1. Cf. also, for example: m. GoLańsKa- 
PłuCienniK: “Kryzys w Hiszpanii…,” p. 149.
 60 m. GoLańsKa-PłuCienniK: “Kryzys w Hiszpanii…,” pp. 150—152.
 61 m. beneDyK: “Kryzys we Włoszech.” In: Kryzys i perspektywy…, p. 112.
 62 Ibidem, p. 113.
 63 Ibidem, pp. 115—116.
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stabilised since the crisis in Greece and in Italy, while clearly falling in Spain. 
This is the result of a decrease of the net loan supply presented in Table 1.5.
Current account balance. Greece and Spain belong to those countries 
whose economies have had a negative current account balance since the 1980s. 
After the establishment of the monetary union, their deficits increased. This 
was due to an increase of domestic demand (which resulted in the mentioned 
increase of public and private debt), as well as an increase of labour costs — 
wages rose faster than work efficiency. This in turn led to an appreciation of the 
real currency exchange rate in periphery states64 (including Greece and Spain) 
and to a deterioration of their export competiveness.65 At the same time, mem-
bership of a state in the monetary union means that it can no longer influence 
the economy by altering the currency exchange rate (e.g. improving export com-
petitiveness by devaluing/depreciating its currency).
Ta b l e  1.7
Current account balance of Greece, Spain, and Italy 
in the years 1997—2015 (in % GDP)
Year Greece Spain Italy Year Greece Spain Italy
1997 n/a –0.8 2.5 2007 –11.8 –8.7 –1.3
1998 n/a –1.0 2.4 2008 –13.9 –9.3 –2.0
1999 n/a –1.9 1.7 2009 –14.2 –7.7 –2.1
2000 n/a –3.1 0.7 2010 –13.0 –5.8 –2.8
2001 n/a –4.0 0.2 2011 –11.3 –3.8 –2.8
2002 n/a –4.2 –0.2 2012 –8.4 –2.4 –2.3
2003 n/a –4.0 –0.3 2013 –5.3 –0.6 –0.9
2004 –7.7 –4.4 –0.4 2014 –2.7 0.8 0.8
2005 –8.3 –5.7 –0.7 2015 –1.4 1.3 1.6
2006 –9.4 –7.4 –1.0
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tipsbp10&tableSelection=1 (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
The current account balance of Greece, Spain, and Italy in the years 1997—
2014 (expressed in % GDP) is shown in Table 1.7. In Greece in particular, these 
deficits were high in the period before the crisis began and in its first years 
after its outbreak. They began to subside in 2011. In Spain, the current account 
balance peaked in the years 2007—2009. Afterwards it began falling until a sur-
plus was achieved in 2014. Italy was in a clearly better situation in this respect. 
In the entire mentioned period, its deficit did not exceed 3% GDP. According 
 64 J. Pietrucha: “Kryzys w strefie euro…,” pp. 21—23.
 65 r. Baldwin, ch. wyPlosz: “The economics…,” p. 491; t. Gruszecki: “Świat na kredy-
cie…,” p. 285.
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to, for example, Kazimierz Łaski and Jerzy Osiatyński, one of the three leading 
causes of the euro area crisis (apart from the strict pursuit of a balanced budget 
and separation of the monetary and fiscal policies, which is characteristic for the 
EMU) was EU’s tolerance of persistent surpluses in foreign trade or on current 
account balances in selected euro area countries at the expense of other states.66
Economic growth. One of the most important manifestations of the eco-
nomic crisis and one of the crucial causes of the deterioration of public finances 
outlined earlier, was economic recession in the EU states (Table 1.8). The worst 
in this respect was 2009, when a negative economic growth rate was recorded 
in all of the EU states with the exception of Poland.
Ta b l e  1.8
Economic growth rate in EU states in the years 2007—2015 
(in %, compared to the previous year)
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 28 3.1 0.5 –4.4 2.1 1.8 –0.5 0.2 1.4 2.0
Austria 3.6 1.5 –3.8 1.9 2.8 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.0
Belgium 3.4 0.7 –2.3 2.7 1.8 0.2 0.0 1.3 1.4
Bulgaria 7.7 5.6 –4.2 0.1 1.6 0.2 1.3 1.5 3.0
Croatia 5.2 2.1 –7.4 –1.7 –0.3 –2.2 –1.1 –0.4 1.6
Cyprus 4.9 3.7 –2.0 1.4 0.4 –2.4 –5.9 –2.5 1.6
Czech Republic 5.5 2.7 –4.8 2.3 2.0 –0.8 –0.5 2.7 4.5
Denmark 0.8 –0.7 –5.1 1.6 1.2 –0.1 –0.2 1.3 1.0
Estonia 7.7 –5.4 –14.7 2.5 7.6 5.2 1.6 2.9 1.1
Finland 5.2 0.7 –8.3 3.0 2.6 –1.4 –0.8 –0.7 0.2
France 2.4 0.2 –2.9 2.0 2.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.3
Greece 3.3 –0.3 –4.3 –5.5 –9.1 –7.3 –3.2 0.7 –0.2
Spain 3.8 1.1 –3.6 0.0 –1.0 –2.6 –1.7 1.4 3.2
The Netherlands 3.7 1.7 –3.8 1.4 1.7 –1.1 –0.2 1.4 2.0
Ireland 3.8 –4.4 –4.6 2.0 0.0 –1.1 1.1 8.5 26.3
Lithuania 11.1 2.6 –14.8 1.6 6.0 3.8 3.5 3.0 1.6
Luxembourg 8.4 –0.8 –5.4 5.7 2.6 –0.8 4.3 4.1 4.8
Latvia 10.0 –3.6 –14.3 –3.8 6.2 4.0 3.0 2.4 2.7
Malta 4.0 3.3 –2.5 3.5 1.9 2.9 4.3 3.5 6.4
Germany 3.3 1.1 –5.6 4.1 3.7 0.4 0.3 1.6 1.7
Poland 7.0 4.2 2.8 3.6 5.0 1.6 1.3 3.3 3.6
Portugal 2.5 0.2 –3.0 1.9 –1.8 –4.0 –1.1 0.9 1.5
 66 K. łasKi, J. osiaTyńsKi: “Konsolidacja finansów publicznych a kryzys strefy euro.” Eko-
nomista 2013, no. 1, pp. 9—30.
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Romania 6.9 8.5 –7.1 –0.8 1.1 0.6 3.5 3.0 3.8
Slovakia 10.8 5.7 –5.5 5.1 2.8 1.5 1.4 2.5 3.6
Slovenia 6.9 3.3 –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.7 –1.1 3.0 2.9
Sweden 3.4 –0.6 –5.2 6.0 2.7 –0.3 1.2 2.3 4.2
Great Britain 2.6 –0.6 –4.3 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.9 3.1 2.2
Hungary 0.4 0.8 –6.6 0.7 1.8 –1.7 1.9 3.7 2.9
Italy 1.5 –1.1 –5.5 1.7 0.6 –2.8 –1.7 –0.3 0.8
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1 (retrieved: 23.07.2016).
The economic growth rate is an indicator which clearly shows that the crisis 
affected particular EU states in varying degrees and that they are re-establishing 
economic growth at different rates. Spain, Italy, and Greece belong to those 
states that are experiencing most difficulties with the crisis, with Greece leading 
the way. Recession was observed in Greece for six consecutive years (2008—
2013), during which time the aggregate GDP decrease amounted to ca. 30%. In 
2015, the GDP in Spain and in Italy was lower than in 2007.
Relative level of wealth/quality of life. Rises and falls in GDP and altera-
tions in its global value among EU states resulted in changes in the GDP per 
capita in relation to the EU average (at purchasing power parity) — Table 1.9. 
This indicator is a synthetic presentation of their levels of wealth in relation to 
other EU states.
Ta b l e  1.9
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in EU states in the years 2007—2015
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Austria 123 124 125 126 127 131 131 129 127
Belgium 115 114 116 119 119 120 120 118 117
Bulgaria 42 45 46 45 45 46 46 47 46
Croatia 61 63 61 59 59 60 59 59 58
Cyprus 100 105 105 102 96 91 84 82 81
Czech Republic 83 81 83 81 83 82 83 84 85
Denmark 121 123 122 126 125 126 126 125 124
Estonia 68 68 62 63 69 74 75 76 74
Finland 117 120 116 115 116 115 113 110 108
France 107 106 107 108 108 107 108 107 106
Greece 92 94 94 87 77 74 74 73 71
Table 1.8 continued
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Spain 103 101 101 97 94 92 91 91 92
The Netherlands 137 139 137 134 134 132 132 131 129
Ireland 146 132 129 130 132 131 131 134 145
Lithuania 60 63 56 60 65 70 73 75 74
Luxembourg 259 255 247 254 263 258 264 266 271
Latvia 60 60 52 52 56 60 62 64 64
Malta 78 80 84 86 84 84 86 86 89
Germany 117 118 116 121 124 124 124 126 125
Poland 53 54 59 62 64 66 67 68 69
Portugal 79 79 81 81 78 77 77 78 77
Romania 41 48 49 50 51 54 54 55 57
Slovakia 67 71 71 73 73 74 76 77 77
Slovenia 87 89 85 83 82 81 80 82 83
Sweden 127 126 122 125 126 127 124 123 123
Hungary 61 63 64 65 65 65 66 68 68
Great Britain 117 114 112 108 106 107 108 109 110
Italy 105 105 104 103 102 101 98 96 95
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1 (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
The data contained in Table 1.9 also shows that the effects of the crisis 
were different in the particular EU states, that is, in most of them, the relative 
average level of wealth increased in the years 2007—2015. Greece, Spain, and 
Italy found themselves at opposing ends — a relative decrease of wealth was 
observed in all these states, which was particularly visible in Greece (decrease 
from 91% of the EU average in 2007 to 71% in 2015). Spain and Italy, which 
had remained slightly above this EU average value in 2007 (103% and 105%, 
respectively), had found themselves below this level a few years after the crisis 
began (92% and 95% in 2015, respectively).
An indicator that paints a more complex picture of the level of development 
and wealth of a state than GDP, is the HDI (Human Development Index) com-
puted and published by the United Nations Development Programme. It covers 
three variables: life expectancy of newborns, length of school education, and the 
gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity (in USD).
Table 1.10 presents the position of EU states in the world based on their 
HDIs in the years 2007—2014. All three states discussed fell in the ranking. 
Greece fell by four positions in the ranking, which is a relatively small decrease 
compared to Italy (9 places) and Spain (11 positions). As a result, all three states 
fell to places 29, 27, and 26, respectively, in 2014.
Table 1.9 continued
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Ta b l e  1.10
Human Development Index for EU states in the years 2007—2014
State
Global HDI position
2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria 14 25 19 18 21 23
Belgium 17 18 18 17 21 21
Bulgaria 61 58 55 57 58 59
Croatia 45 51 46 47 47 47
Cyprus 32 35 31 31 32 32
Czech Republic 36 28 27 28 28 28
Denmark 16 19 16 15 10 4
Estonia 40 34 34 33 33 30
Finland 12 16 22 21 24 24
France 8 14 20 20 20 22
Greece 25 22 29 29 29 29
Spain 15 20 23 23 27 26
The Netherlands 6 7 3 4 4 5
Ireland 5 5 7 7 11 6
Lithuania 46 44 40 41 35 37
Luxembourg 11 24 25 26 21 19
Latvia 48 48 43 44 48 46
Malta 38 33 36 32 39 37
Germany 22 10 9 5 6 6
Poland 41 41 39 39 35 36
Portugal 34 40 41 43 41 43
Romania 63 50 50 56 54 52
Slovakia 42 31 35 35 37 35
Slovenia 29 29 21 21 25 25
Sweden 7 9 10 7 12 14
Hungary 43 36 38 37 43 44
Great Britain 21 26 28 26 14 14
Italy 18 23 24 25 26 27
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on: Human Development Report 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015:
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr_2011_en_complete.pdf
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
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The relative position of a state in the ranking does not provide a full picture 
of the situation and may, to a certain degree, be misleading. This is because the 
situation in the state may improve, at times even significantly, however, if the 
situation in other countries in the ranking were to improve even more, the posi-
tion of the state under analysis would fall regardless. Alternately, a state may 
go up in the ranking even though it experienced a setback. This would happen 
when other states would be experiencing even greater problems.
Therefore in order to gain a clearer picture of the changes taking place in 
Greece, Spain, and Italy, Table 1.11 presents HDI values for the period 2007—
2014. This data shows that the fall in the position of Greece, Spain, and Italy, 
compared to other states of the world (Table 1.10), was not only caused by 
a relative change of their situation due to the improvement or deterioration of 
the situation in other states. In all of the three countries, the HDI in 2013 was 
only slightly lower than in 2007. In 2014, there was a marked improvement by 
Greece and Spain, wherein they reached an HDI of 2007.
Ta b l e  1.11
HDI for Greece, Spain, and Italy in 2007—2014
State 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Greece 0.865 0.858 0.863 0.862 0.861 0.860 0.853 0.865
Spain 0.874 0.857 0.874 0.876 0.878 0.885 0.869 0.876
Italy 0.878 0.868 0.870 0.873 0.874 0.881 0.872 0.873
Source: As in Table 1.10.
Unemployment. Taking into account the data on economic growth in the 
years 2007—2015 in EU states (Table 1.8), an increase in unemployment ob-
served in this same period does not come as a surprise (Table 1.12). Also in 
this respect, there is a certain level of differentiation in the situation between 
EU states, that is, there are states in which unemployment at the end of 2015 
was lower than at the end of 2007 (Czech Republic, Malta, Germany, Poland, 
Hungary), while in the other EU states it increased. The highest unemployment 
level was recorded in Greece and Spain, where it increased threefold, achieving 
a value of one quarter of all people fit to work. In Italy, the increase was more 
or less twofold — from 6.1% in December 2007 to 11.9% in December 2015.
Ta b l e  1.12
Unemployment in the EU in the years 2007—2015 (in %, in December of each year)
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
UE 27 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.8 10.2 9.4
EU 28 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4
Austria 4.9 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7
Belgium 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5
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Bulgaria 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 11.3 12.3 13.0 11.4 9.2
Croatia 9.9 8.6 9.2 11.7 13.7 16.0 17.3 17.3 16.3
Cyprus 3.9 3.7 5.4 6.3 7.9 11.9 15.9 16.1 15.0
Czech Republic 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1 5.1
Denmark 3.8 3.4 6.0 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2
Estonia 4.6 5.5 13.5 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 6.2
Finland 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4
France 8.0 7.4 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4
Greece 8.4 7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9
Spain 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1
The Netherlands 4.2 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.0 5.8 7.3 7.4 6.9
Ireland 4.7 6.4 12.0 13.9 14.7 14.7 13.1 11.3 9.4
Lithuania 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1
Luxembourg 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 6.4
Latvia 6.1 7.7 17.5 19.5 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 9.9
Malta 6.5 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.4
Germany 8.5 7.4 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6
Poland 9.6 7.1 8.1 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3 9.0 7.5
Portugal 9.1 8.8 10.7 12.0 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 12.6
Romania 6.4 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.8
Slovakia 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 14.0 14.2 13.2 11.5
Slovenia 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7 9.0
Sweden 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.6 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.4
Great Britain 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.6 6.1 5.3
Hungary 7.4 7.8 10.0 11.2 11.0 11.0 10.2 7.7 6.8
Italy 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Eurostat tables, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec450&plugin=1 (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
With regard to Greece, it is worth noting here one additional circumstance. 
In 2009, there were approx. 5 million people fit to work, which constituted 54% 
of the population. Of this number, 514 thousand people were unemployed and 
972 thousand worked either directly in the public sector or in companies that 
cooperated therewith. This means that approx. one in every five people worked 
in the public sector, while at the same time in Germany, this figure amounted 
to one in twenty.67
 67 a. ioannis: The Greek Tragedy. The European Financial Crisis in Simple Words. (n. p.) 
2015, p. 43.
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From among the EU states, only Cyprus experienced a higher unemploy-
ment level than Greece and Spain in the same period. In this case, however, 
in 2007, the unemployment rate was ca. two times lower than in Greece and 
Spain. An unemployment rate of 25%, which was noted in Greece and Spain, 
is considered to be very high and is a crucial factor, the effects of which go far 
beyond the economy itself.
Income differentiation. Another indicator that provides us with a certain 
level of information about the condition and dynamics of changes in the eco-
nomic system of a state, is the Gini coefficient. It is a measure of inequality of 
income or wealth among residents. It assumes a value of 0 (perfect equality, i.e. 
everybody possesses an equal amount of wealth) to 1 (or 100; perfect inequality, 
i.e. one person possesses all the wealth). This means that the higher the Gini 
coefficient, the greater the inequality. In practice, the value ranges from ca. 25 
(some EU states) to over 60 (e.g. some African states).
The Gini coefficient values (concerning income distribution) in EU states 
in the years 2007—2015 are contained in Table 1.13. This information tells us 
that in all of the analysed states, the income inequality in this period was higher 
than the average for the entire EU. Of the three states, Italy’s index remained 
closest to the average. In the case of Greece and Italy, the crisis did not lead 
to any significant income inequalities — in 2015, they were almost identical as 
in 2007. The greatest increase of income inequality occurred in Spain — from 
31.9 in 2007 to 34.6 in 2015, and after Cyprus (and France, in which the Gini 
coefficient was clearly lower), this was the highest increase in the entire EU.
Ta b l e  1.13
Gini coefficient (showing income inequality) in EU states in the years 2007—2015
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU n/a n/a n/a 30.4 30.8 30.4 30.5 31.0 n/a
Austria 26.2 27.7 27.5 28.3 27.4 27.6 27.0 27.6 27.2
Belgium 26.3 27.5 26.4 26.6 26.3 26.5 25.9 25.9 26.2
Bulgaria 35.3 35.9 33.4 33.2 35.0 33.6 35.4 35.4 37.0
Croatia n/a n/a n/a 31.6 31.2 30.9 30.9 30.2 n/a
Cyprus 29.8 29.0 29.5 30.1 29.2 31.0 32.4 34.8 n/a
Czech Republic 25.3 24.7 25.1 24.9 25.2 24.9 24.6 25.1 n/a
Denmark 25.2 25.1 26.9 26.9 26.6 26.5 26.8 27.7 27.4
Estonia 33.4 30.9 31.4 31.3 31.9 32.5 32.9 35.6 n/a
Finland 26.2 26.3 25.9 25.4 25.8 25.9 25.4 25.6 25.2
France 26.6 29.8 29.9 29.8 30.8 30.5 30.1 29.2 n/a
Greece 34.3 33.4 33.1 32.9 33.5 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.2
Spain 31.9 32.4 32.9 33.5 34.0 34.2 33.7 34.7 34.6
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The Netherlands 27.6 27.6 27.2 25.5 25.8 25.4 25.1 26.2 26.4
Ireland 31.3 29.9 28.8 30.7 29.8 29.9 30.0 30.8 n/a
Lithuania 33.8 34.5 35.9 37.0 33.0 32.0 34.6 35.0 n/a
Luxembourg 27.4 27.7 29.2 27.9 27.2 28.0 30.4 28.7 n/a
Latvia 35.4 37.5 37.5 35.9 35.1 35.7 35.2 35.5 35.4
Malta 26.3 28.1 27.4 28.6 27.2 27.1 27.9 27.7 n/a
Germany 30.4 30.2 29.1 29.3 29.0 28.3 29.7 30.7 n/a
Poland 32.2 32.0 31.4 31.1 31.1 30.9 30.7 30.8 n/a
Portugal 36.8 35.8 35.4 33.7 34.2 34.5 34.2 34.5 34.0
Romania 37.8 36.0 34.9 33.3 33.2 33.2 34.0 34.7 n/a
Slovakia 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 25.3 24.2 26.1 n/a
Slovenia 23.2 23.4 22.7 23.8 23.8 23.7 24.4 25.0 24.5
Sweden 23.4 24.0 24.8 24.1 24.4 24.8 24.9 25.4 n/a
Hungary 25.6 25.2 24.7 24.1 26.9 27.2 28.3 28.6 28.2
Great Britain 32.6 33.9 32.4 32.9 33.0 31.3 30.2 31.6 n/a
Italy 32.2 31.0 31.8 31.7 32.5 32.4 32.8 32.4 n/a
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi190&plugin=1 
(retrieved: 24.07.2016).
Wages and income levels. It seems that such values as the economic growth 
rate, public debt, public sector deficit etc. are abstract for most people. For most 
people they do not have any personal significance, nor is there any perceiv-
able connection between changes in these factors and people’s personal material 
situation. However, indices measuring the standard of living of a given state’s 
residents paint a different picture. Any alternations in this respect also affect 
people’s opinions, preferences and political behaviours much more than “ab-
stract” macroeconomic data.
As mentioned previously, after establishment of the monetary union, there 
was a significant inflow of capital into so-called EU periphery states, which led, 
among others, to an increase in wages.68 Data showing the average annual sal-
ary increase in Greece, Spain, and in Italy and changes in household income in 
the years 2001—2015 is contained in Table 1.14. The table clearly shows that in 
pre-2009 Greece, wages were clearly rising and this increase was higher than in, 
for example, Spain or Italy. After the crisis, wages fell quickly and significantly 
— over a period of six years between 2009 and 2015 by ca. 25%.
 68 “Nie udawaj Greka. Oszczędzaj.” A conversation with hans-werner sinn. Gazeta 
Wyborcza of 23.05.2011, p. 28—29.
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Ta b l e  1.14
Wages and changes in disposable household income 
in Greece, Spain, and Italy in the years 2001—2015
State/
index
Greece Spain Italy
Average 
income
(annually, 
USD)
Household
income
(net,
year to year 
change in %)
Average 
income
(annually, 
USD)
Household
income
(net,
year to year 
change in %)
Average 
income
(annually, 
USD)
Household
income
(net,
year to year 
change in %)
2001 26,200 3.7 34,266 3.3 33,720 2.6
2002 28,634 4.4 34,518 3.4 33,492 1.0
2003 29,877 7.6 34,425 4.0 33,485 0.6
2004 30,413 3.2 34,070 3.0 34,138 1.4
2005 30,322 0.6 34,268 2.9 34,528 0.6
2006 30,685 5.4 34,138 2.1 34,768 1.0
2007 30,677 3.2 34,585 1.2 34,732 1.2
2008 30,217 0.8 35,977 2.4 34,770 –1.1
2009 31,635 0.6 38,414 3.4 34,941 –1.9
2010 29,528 –10.5 37,755 –2.9 35,275 –1.4
2011 27,590 –10.6 37,220 –1.2 34,728 –0.6
2012 26,340 –9.8 36,062 –5.2 33,681 –4.9
2013 24,812 –6.6 36,382 –1.8 33,730 –0.7
2014 24,993 –1.6 36,034 0.6 33,890 0.0
2015 25,211 n/a 36,325 n/a 34,140 0.6
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on OECD data:
https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-income.htm
https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/average-wages.htm (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
In Spain and Italy, the trend was the same as in Greece, but the scale much 
less extensive, that is, the ratio of the pre-crisis wage increase to its post-cri-
sis fall was not that high. One of the consequences of the wage increases in 
Greece and Spain, which were introduced faster than in other EU states, was 
a deterioration of the economic competitiveness of these states (as confirmed 
by economic competitiveness scores, which will be mentioned later). In 2011, 
for instance Hans-Werner Sinn stated that “in Greece, the salary and price cuts 
necessary for the reestablishment of competiveness would have to amount to 
20—30 percent. This is a very difficult situation from a political point of view. 
Unions will most probably step out on the streets rather than accept such salary 
cuts.”69 Subsequent political events showed that it is extremely difficult to expect 
 69 Ibidem.
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social acceptance for wage cuts. At the same time, the statistical data contained 
in Table 1.14 suggests that such cuts were actually adopted.
Household debt. Another crucial indicator allowing for a more precise de-
termination of changes in the material situation of states affected by the crisis 
is household debt. Relevant data concerning Greece, Spain, and Italy presenting 
debt-to-income ratios in the period from 2001 to 2014 is contained in Table 1.15.
Ta b l e  1.15
Household debt in Greece, Spain, and Italy in the years 2001—2014 
(in % of disposable income)
Year Greece Spain Italy Year Greece Spain Italy
2001 37.9  87.1 56.6 2008  87.1 150.2 81.7
2002 43.8  94.1 59.4 2009  87.8 145.1 86.6
2003 48.2 102.3 62.6 2010 105.2 148.1 90.5
2004 54.9 113.6 66.3 2011 112.0 142.4 90.0
2005 67.2 128.2 71.3 2012 119.8 140.8 92.1
2006 74.0 144.3 76.2 2013 121.6 133.9 90.9
2007 82.6 154.4 80.2 2014 115.0 127.3 90.2
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on OECD data: https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm (re-
trieved: 24.07.2016).
Based on the above information we can see that in Greece, the household 
debt in relation to income rose systematically until 2013 and finally fell in 2014 
for the first time in the entire analysed period. Italy’s debt stabilised in 2010 at 
approx. 90% of the disposable income. In Spain, however, the highest level of 
household debt was noted in 2007, after which it stabilised for a few years, only 
to clearly begin decreasing in 2010, and had remained at the highest level out of 
all the three states in question for the whole time.
Economic competitiveness. A synthetic evaluation of the changes taking 
place not only in the economy itself, but also in the entire political and social 
spectra is provided by different economic competitiveness rankings prepared 
and published by various institutions. None of them, however, is able to provide 
a complete picture of the situation. Nevertheless, given the fact that the rank-
ings are prepared using different methodologies and that they take into account 
several to several hundred different factors (both of an objective, i.e. numerical 
data, and subjective nature, i.e. interviews), treating them in combination pro-
vides a certain picture of the processes taking place in the economy of a state. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter will present summaries showing 
how the rankings of Greece, Spain, and Italy evolved over time compared to the 
other EU states. The summaries are based on periodically published rankings of 
four international institutions and organisations.
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Ta b l e  1.16
Position of EU states in terms of economic competitiveness according to the 
World Economic Forum in 2008/2009—2015/2016
State
2008/2009 2011/2012 2013/2014 2015/2016
Place
(out 
of 134 
states)
Points
(1—7)
Place 
(out 
of 142 
states)
Points
(1—7)
Place 
(out of 
148
states)
Points
(1—7)
Place 
(out 
of 140 
states)
Points
(1—7)
Austria 14 5.23 19 5.14 16 5.15 23 5.12
Belgium 19 5.14 15 5.20 17 5.13 19 5.20
Bulgaria 76 4.03 74 4.16 57 4.31 54 4.32
Croatia 61 4.22 76 4.08 75 4.13 77 4.07
Cyprus 40 4.53 47 4.36 58 4.30 65 4.23
Czech Republic 33 4.62 38 4.52 46 4.43 31 4.69
Denmark  3 5.58  8 5.40 15 5.18 12 5.33
Estonia 32 4.67 33 4.62 32 4.65 30 4.74
Finland  6 5.50  4 5.47  3 5.54  8 5.45
France 16 5.22 18 5.14 23 5.05 22 5.13
Greece 67 4.11 90 3.92 91 3.93 81 4.02
Spain 29 4.72 36 4.54 35 4.57 33 4.59
The Netherlands  8 5.41  7 5.41  8 5.42  5 5.50
Ireland 22 4.99 29 4.77 28 4.92 24 5.11
Lithuania 44 4.45 44 4.41 48 4.41 36 4.55
Luxembourg 25 4.85 23 5.03 22 5.09 20 5.20
Latvia 54 4.26 64 4.24 52 4.40 44 4.45
Malta 52 4.31 51 4.33 41 4.50 48 4.39
Germany  7 5.46  6 5.41  4 5.51  4 5.53
Poland 53 4.28 41 4.46 42 4.46 41 4.49
Portugal 43 4.47 45 4.40 51 4.40 38 4.52
Romania 68 4.10 77 4.08 76 4.13 53 4.32
Slovakia 46 4.40 69 4.19 78 4.10 67 4.22
Slovenia 42 4.50 57 4.30 62 4.25 59 4.28
Sweden  4 5.53  3 5.61  6 5.48  9 5.43
Hungary 62 4.22 48 4.36 63 4.25 63 4.25
Great Britain 12 5.30 10 5.39 10 5.37 10 5.43
Italy 49 4.35 43 4.43 49 4.41 43 4.46
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on: The Global Competitiveness Report 2008—2009, 2011—
2012, 2013—2014, 2015—2016, http://www.weforum.org/reports?filter[type]=Competitiveness (retrieved: 
11.12.2015).
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The first contains selected competitiveness rankings from the period of 
2008/2009 — 2015/2016 prepared by the World Economic Forum (Table 1.16). 
Out of the three states of interest, Spain ranked the highest. It first experienced 
a downturn right after the crisis, only to gradually make up its losses in the con-
secutive years. This slight fall of Spain’s position is observed in relative terms 
when compared to other states (position in the ranking), and in absolute values 
(number of points given). The same kind of evolution took place in Greece, 
except that this state’s economy was evaluated as being much less competitive 
compared to that of Spain. It is noted that before the crisis, Greece was docu-
mented as almost the least competitive economy in the entire EU (before the 
least competitive economies of Romania and Bulgaria) and the crisis made its 
situation even worse. Since the 2011/2012 report, Greece’s economy is consid-
ered clearly the least competitive in the entire EU. Italy’s competitiveness of 
economy ranks lower than Spain’s, but is higher than that of Greece and remains 
relatively stable.
Ta b l e  1.17
Competitiveness of EU states according to the International Institute 
for Management Development in the years 2008—2014
State
2008 2010 2012 2014
Place
(out 
of 55 
states)
Points
Place 
(out 
of 58 
states)
Points
Place 
(out of 
59
states)
Points
Place 
(out 
of 60 
states)
Points
Austria 14 75.028 14 84.085 21 77.67 22 73.699
Belgium 24 68.746 25 73.586 25 73.48 28 66.595
Bulgaria 39 51.392 53 47.756 54 48.45 56 45.784
Croatia 49 45.203 56 40.056 57 45.30 59 38.974
Cyprus n/a — n/a — n/a — n/a —
Czech Republic 28 62.247 29 65.433 33 66.19 33 62.213
Denmark  6 83.852 13 85.587 13 84.88  9 84.040
Estonia 23 69.648 34 62.641 31 66.95 30 64.383
Finland 15 75.025 19 80.002 17 82.47 18 78.159
France 25 66.012 24 74.372 29 70.00 27 67.941
Greece 42 48.761 46 52.304 58 43.05 57 42.244
Spain 33 57.515 36 58.752 39 61.12 39 57.913
The Netherlands 10 80.476 12 85.650 11 87.16 14 81.144
Ireland 12 77.638 21 78.144 20 78.47 15 80.360
Lithuania 36 56.234 43 54.098 36 63.42 34 62.014
Luxembourg  5 84.405 11 86.867 12 86.05 11 82.164
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Latvia n/a — n/a — n/a — 35 61.848
Malta n/a — n/a — n/a — n/a —
Germany 16 74.735 16 82.730  9 89.26  6 85.782
Poland 44 47.986 32 64.482 34 64.18 36 61.767
Portugal 37 54.657 37 57.096 41 60.38 43 54.403
Romania 45 47.549 54 40.056 53 48.93 47 52.841
Slovakia 30 59.365 49 51.092 47 55.67 45 53.302
Slovenia 32 57.904 52 48.689 51 52.96 55 46.245
Sweden  9 82.464 6 90.893  5 91.39  5 85.833
Hungary 38 52.932 42 54.124 45 57.34 48 52.505
Great Britain 21 71.904 22 76.808 18 80.14 16 79.814
Italy 46 46.921 40 56.320 40 60.64 46 52.871
Source: International Institute for Management Development, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014, http://www.imd.org (retrieved: 11.11.2015).
The second list presented here is the competitiveness ranking of states, pre-
pared by the International Institute for Management Development. Table 1.17 
presents the position of EU states in terms of this criterion in the period from 
2008 until 2014. In 2014 the classification covered 60 states. That year, Italy 
had maintained its position from 2008, it has to be being noted, however, that it 
was rather low to start with (46th out of 55 states in 2008 and out of 60 states 
in 2014). Greece and Spain, though, noted considerable decreases — Greece for 
42nd place in 2008 to 57th in 2014, whereas Spain from 33rd to 39th in the same 
period. In the case of Greece, its relative fall in the ranking was accompanied by 
a clear decrease in the amount of points. Spain, on the other hand, was ranked 
almost identically, while Italy’s position clearly improved, which, as mentioned, 
helped maintain its position from 2008 in 2014. Additional reasons for such 
a low level of competitiveness of the Greek economy to those mentioned ear-
lier also include its unwillingness to privatise even the most unprofitable state 
companies and holding them in favour at the expense of private ones (e.g. when 
subsidising), as well as subsidising the labour market and its lack of flexibility.70
Another classification (Table 1.18), which provides us with a picture on how 
the economic crisis influenced the economies of EU states, is an assessment on 
the ease of conducting business activity for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
In 2015, 189 states were assessed in terms of their laws regulating business ac-
tivity, such as starting a business, debt recovery, or international trade.
 70 P. KuPisz: “Kryzys w Grecji…,” pp. 128—129.
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Ta b l e  1.18
Position of EU states in the world in terms of ease of economic activity 
in the years 2007—2015
State/EU 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Austria 25 26 31 28 32 29 30 21 21
Belgium 19 20 22 27 28 33 36 42 43
Bulgaria 46 42 51 57 59 66 58 38 38
Croatia 97 110 89 79 80 84 89 65 40
Cyprus n/a 36 35 49 40 36 39 64 47
Czech Republic 56 66 82 70 64 65 75 44 36
Denmark 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 3
Estonia 17 22 17 18 24 21 22 17 16
Finland 13 14 11 14 11 11 12 9 10
France 31 31 28 26 29 34 38 31 27
Greece 100 100 97 101 100 78 72 61 60
Spain 38 51 48 45 44 44 52 33 33
The Netherlands 21 28 29 29 31 31 28 27 28
Ireland 8 7 8 8 10 15 15 13 17
Lithuania 26 25 26 25 27 27 17 24 20
Luxembourg 42 53 42 44 50 56 60 59 61
Latvia 22 30 27 31 21 25 24 23 22
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 102 103 94 80
Germany 20 27 21 19 19 20 21 14 15
Poland 74 72 73 59 62 55 45 32 25
Portugal 37 48 33 30 30 30 31 25 23
Romania 48 45 54 65 72 72 73 48 37
Slovakia 32 35 40 43 48 46 49 37 29
Slovenia 55 58 43 37 37 35 33 51 29
Sweden 14 17 18 9 14 13 14 11 8
Hungary 45 41 52 46 51 54 54 54 42
Great Britain 6 6 4 6 7 7 10 8 6
Italy 53 74 76 83 87 73 65 56 45
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Doing Business 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org (retrieved: 24.07.2016).
In contrast, a significant relative improvement was noted for Greece in this 
respect — it advanced from place 100 in 2007 to 60 in 2015, the improve-
ment itself occurring in the period from 2011—2014. No other state in the EU 
had recorded such a drastic improvement. The reason behind the improvement 
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most probably included the reforms introduced to counteract the economic cri-
sis. Spain also advanced 5 places in 2015 compared to 2007 (from 38 to 33). 
Also Italy, following a significant fall in the ranking in the years 2008—2011, 
reached a much better position in 2015 than in 2007 (a move from position 
53 to 45).
Table 1.19 shows EU states in the years 2008—2014 in terms of their posi-
tion in the economic freedom index prepared by The Heritage Foundation. The 
index includes a classification of over 180 states from around the world and 
a state’s score takes into account the following ten criteria: respect for property 
rights, level of corruption, taxes, public spending, ease of doing business, labour 
market regulations, monetary policy regulations, foreign trade regulations, in-
vestments, and financial transfers. The maximum score for each of the criteria 
is 100, whereas the final score is the average of the ten criteria, its maximum 
being 100.
The data presented in Table 1.19 shows that both Greece and Spain, as well 
as Italy, dropped significantly in terms of the economic freedom index in the 
years 2008—2014 compared to other countries around the world. Spain fell 
by 18 positions, Italy — 22, and Greece by 39. In absolute values, that is, tak-
ing into account the index value change — the scale of deterioration is clearly 
smaller, but affects all three states. This means that the fall in the ranking was 
caused mainly by an improvement of the situation in other states, although its 
deterioration in Greece, Spain, and Italy also took its toll.
Ta b l e  1.19
Economic freedom index in the EU (prepared by The Heritage Foundation) 
in the years 2008—2014
State
2008 2010 2012 2014
Global 
position
Points
Global 
position
Points
Global 
position
Points
Global 
position
Points
Austria 30 70.0 22 71.6 28 70.3 24 72.4
Belgium 20 71.5 30 70.1 38 69.0 35 69.9
Bulgaria 59 62.9 75 62.3 61 64.7 61 65.7
Croatia 113 54.6 92 59.2 83 60.9 87 60.4
Cyprus 22 71.3 24 70.9 20 71.8 46 67.6
Czech Republic 37 68.5 34 69.8 30 69.9 26 72.2
Denmark 11 79.2  9 77.9 11 76.2 10 76.1
Estonia 12 77.8 16 74.7 16 73.2 11 75.9
Finland 16 74.8 17 73.8 17 72.3 19 73.4
France 48 65.4 64 64.2 67 63.2 70 63.5
Greece 80 60.1 73 62.7 119 55.4 119 55.7
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Spain 31 69.7 36 69.6 36 69.1 49 67.2
The Netherlands 13 76.8 15 75.0 15 73.3 15 74.2
Ireland 3 82.4  5 81.3 9 76.9 9 76.2
Lithuania 26 70.8 29 70.3 23 71.5 21 73.0
Luxembourg 15 75.2 14 75.4 13 74.5 16 74.2
Latvia 38 68.3 50 66.2 56 65.2 42 68.7
Malta 47 66.0 48 67.2 50 67.0 58 66.4
Germany 23 71.2 23 71.1 26 71.0 18 73.4
Poland 83 59.5 71 63.2 64 64.2 50 67.0
Portugal 53 64.3 62 64.4 68 63.0 69 63.5
Romania 68 61.5 63 64.2 62 64.4 62 65.5
Slovakia 35 68.7 35 69.7 51 67.0 57 66.4
Slovenia 75 60.6 61 64.7 69 62.9 74 62.7
Sweden 27 70.4 21 72.4 21 71.7 20 73.1
Hungary 43 67.2 51 66.1 49 67.1 51 67.0
Great Britain 10 79.5 11 76.5 14 74.1 14 74.9
Italy 64 62.5 74 62.7 92 58.8 86 60.9
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 Index of Economic Freedom
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/index/pdf/2008/Index2008_ExecutiveSummary.pdf
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/index/pdf/2010/Index2010_ExecutiveHighlights.pdf
https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/index/pdf/2012/Executive-Highlights.pdf
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/executivehighlights.pdf (retrieved: 11.11.2015).
The “informal economy.” The informal economy is the reason why of-
ficial data does not always reflect the actual situation concerning, for example, 
unemployment, income differentiation, or the standard of living. Its scale, for 
obvious reasons, is very difficult, if not impossible, to assess and measure. It 
is worth however obtaining a rough estimate of its extent. Table 1.20 contains 
estimates of the size of the informal economy in EU states in relation to the 
GDP in the years 2008 and 2014. The figures are based on the results of tests 
conducted for the last dozen or so years by Friedrich Schneider of the Linz 
University.
The above data shows us that in Greece, and to a lesser extent, in Italy, the 
size of the informal economy is greater than the average for the EU, whereas 
in Spain, it is roughly the same. During the crisis, that is, between 2008 and 
2014, the size of the informal economy in neither of the states in question, did 
not undergo any significant change.
Table 1.19 continued
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Ta b l e  1.20
Size of the informal economy in EU states in relation to their GDP 
 in the years 2008 and 2014 (in % GDP)
State
“Informal economy”
State
“Informal economy”
2008 2014 2008 2014
EU 19.6 18.6 Lithuania 29.1 27.1
Austria  8.1  7.8 Luxembourg  8.5  8.1
Belgium 17.5 16.1 Latvia 26.5 24.7
Bulgaria 32.1 31.0 Malta 25.8 24.0
Croatia 29.6 28.0 Germany 14.2 12.2
Cyprus 26.0 25.7 Poland 25.3 23.5
Czech Republic 16.6 15.3 Portugal 18.7 18.7
Denmark 13.9 12.8 Romania 29.4 28.1
Estonia 29.0 27.1 Slovakia 16.0 14.6
Finland 13.8 12.9 Slovenia 24.0 23.5
France 11.1 10.8 Sweden 14.9 13.6
Greece 24.3 23.3 Great Britain 10.1  9.6
Spain 18.4 18.5 Hungary 23.0 21.6
The Netherlands  9.6  9.2 Italy 21.4 20.8
Ireland 12.2 11.8
Source: F. sChneiDer: Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD 
Countries from 2003 to 2015: Different Developments, pp. 6—7, http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider 
/files/publications/2015/ShadEcEurope31.pdf (retrieved: 9.11.2015).
Corruption. The last summary concerns the level of corruption in the pub-
lic sector based on data prepared by Transparency International (TI). Table 1.21 
contains relevant data concerning EU states in the years 2008 and 2014, that is, 
their position in the world and the perceived level of corruption expressed in 
points. The states are arranged according to their place in the world as of 2014.
The data in Table 1.21 shows that the perceived level of corruption in the 
public sector in Greece, Spain, and in Italy rose between 2008 and 2014. And 
like before, this value concerns both the relative position of these states — all 
of them in 2004 were classified a dozen or so positions lower than in 2008, 
and the corruption values expressed in points. It is also worth noting that in 
Spain, the perceived level of corruption is, according to TI, clearly lower (37th 
position in the world in 2014) than in Greece and Italy (position 69 of both the 
states in 2014). In both these states, along with Bulgaria and Romania, the level 
of corruption in the public sector in 2014 was, according to TI, the highest in 
the entire EU.
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Ta b l e  1.21
Corruption Perception Index acc. Transparency International 
in the EU in the years 2008 and 2014
State
2008 2014
Position
in the world
Corruption
levela
Position
in the world
Corruption
level
Denmark  1 9.3  1 92
Finland  5 9.0  3 89
Sweden  1 9.3  4 87
The Netherlands  7 8.9  8 83
Luxembourg 11 8.3  9 82
Germany 14 79 12 79
Great Britain 16 7.7 14 78
Belgium 18 7.3 15 76
Ireland 16 7.7 17 74
Austria 12 8.1 23 72
Estonia 27 6.6 26 69
France 23 6.9 26 69
Cyprus 31 6.4 31 63
Portugal 32 6.1 31 63
Poland 58 4.6 35 61
Spain 28 6.5 37 60
Lithuania 58 4.6 39 58
Slovenia 26 6.7 39 58
Malta 36 5.8 43 55
Latvia 52 5.0 43 55
Hungary 47 5.1 47 54
Czech Republic 45 5.2 53 51
Slovakia 52 5.0 54 50
Croatia 62 4.4 61 48
Bulgaria 72 3.6 69 43
Greece 57 4.7 69 43
Italy 55 4.8 69 43
Romania 70 3.8 69 43
a  Perceived level of corruption in the public sector on a scale from 0 (very high corruption) to 100 (very low 
corruption). In 2008, the scale ranged from 0 to 10.
Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi 
2014/results; Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2008, http://www.transparency.org 
/research/cpi/cpi_2008 (retrieved: 9.11.2015).
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1.4  Greece, Spain, and Italy in the fight with the economic 
effects of the crisis
In several EU states, the consequences of the crisis that started in 2008, as 
well as the deterioration of the macroeconomic position was so severe, that they 
were forced to turn for financial assistance to the EU and other international 
organisations and institutions. Eight of the following EU states did so: Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Latvia, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Cyprus. The bailout 
totals (not in all cases were they used up entirely), their sources and the periods 
they were granted for, are contained in Table 1.22. The assistance mainly came 
from funding institutions created by the EU (EFSM, EFSF, ESM71) but also 
from the IMF, from bilateral loans granted by other member states as well as 
from the EU itself, from the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and the European Investment Bank.
Ta b l e  1.22
Financial assistance granted to EU states because of the crisis
State
Value
(maximum, in billion euros)
Sources Duration
Hungary 20 EU, IMF, WB 2008—2010
Latvia 7.5 EU, IMF, WB, EBRD, 
bilateral loans
2009—2012
Romania 1st assistance programme: 20 EU, IMF, WB, EIB, 
EBRD
2009—2011
2nd assistance programme:
(preventive, unused): 1.4
EU, IMF 2011—2013
3rd assistance programme:
(preventive, unused): 2
EU, IMF 2013—2015
Ireland 85 EFSM, EFSF, IMF, 
bilateral loans
2010—2013
Greece 1st assistance programme: 77.3 + 30 bilateral loans IMF 2010—2013
2nd asisstance programme: 164.5 EFSF, IMF 2012—2015
3rd assistance programme: 86 ESM 2015—2018
 71 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism was created in 2010. That same year, 
the EFSF, that is, the European Financial Stability Facility was founded. The institution was 
a limited liability special purpose vehicle of a temporary nature. In 2011, a paragraph was added 
to article 136 of the TEU allowing the EMU to create a “stability mechanism.” As a result, the 
EFSM and the EFSF were to operate until 2013 and were eventually replaced with the ESM (the 
treaty establishing it entered into force in 2012), which takes the form of an intergovernmental 
organisation operating on the basis of international public law but is closely connected with the 
EU. More in: T. Kubin: Legitymizacja systemu…, pp. 394—396.
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Portugal 78 EFSM, EFSF, IMF 2011—2014
Spain 100 bilateral loans 2012—2014
Cyprus 10 ESM, IMF 2013—2016
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on EC information (retrieved: 26.12.2015):
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/hungary/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/latvia/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/romania/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/ireland/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/portugal/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/spain/index_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/cyprus/index_en.htm.
In terms of the external assistance granted and the economic reforms pur-
sued, each of the three states in question needs to be treated individually. This 
is because the granting of the assistance (and payout of the subsequent tranches) 
depended on the introduction of specific economic reforms. These reforms, their 
social effects and the defined manifestations of the crisis influenced the func-
tioning of the political systems of the particular states.
Greece found itself in the most difficult situation, as it was virtually bank-
rupt and unable to pay off its debts without external assistance. The reforms 
themselves, which were a condition for the subsequent bailouts, dealt a strong 
blow to Greece’s political situation. What impacted it even more were the cir-
cumstances accompanying the adoption and delivery of the subsequent bailout 
programmes, that is, many month-long negotiations between Greece and EU’s 
institutions and the IMF, the regular summits and last-minute negotiations be-
tween their representatives, IMF’s and EU’s constant oversight of the Greek 
economy, the dynamics of events on the Greek political scene (mainly the elec-
tions to the parliament but also a referendum on the acceptance of the bailout by 
Greece) or threat of Greece’s leaving or being thrown out of the euro area. All 
of this gave the impression that since more or less 2010, Greece was in the cen-
tre of attention of EU’s institutions, European public opinion and of the media.
The situation in Spain and Italy was different. Spain received assistance as 
part of one package meant to help financial institutions. Therefore, the reforms 
recommended by the EU and the conditions for receiving the bailout applied 
only to the financial sector. Other economic reforms introduced by the Spanish 
authorities were not a condition for receiving financial aid but resulted from the 
legal regulations that applied to all states of the euro area and the EU and from 
legislation introduced by Spain itself. However, Italy did not use any external 
financial assistance and the anti-crisis reforms were introduced as part of legis-
lation that applied to all states of the euro area and the EU as well as individual 
legislation introduced by Italy.
Table 1.22 continued
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Greece. Issues with public debt service in Greece became apparent at the 
beginning of 2010. As shown in section 1.3, 2009 was the most difficult year 
for EU states in economic terms throughout the entire crisis. A deterioration of 
Greece’s macroeconomic indicators (mainly a very significant increase of pub-
lic debt, a permanent deficit of the public finance sector, economic recession), 
combined with a fall in confidence in financial markets and an increase of bor-
rowing costs, left Greece facing problems with obtaining the funds necessary to 
pay off its debt. External help was indispensible.
The first assistance programme for Greece (the Greek Loan Facility), was 
drafted in the form of bilateral loans from the euro area states. At first, their val-
ue was not to exceed 80 billion euro, but as Slovakia decided not to participate, 
and because Ireland and Portugal had to decrease their share of assistance due to 
their own problems, the final aid package amounted to 77.3 billion euro.72 Apart 
from this assistance, the IMF declared an additional 30 billion euro for Greece 
as part of the so-called stand-by arrangement.73 The objectives of the necessary 
reforms of the Greek economy and the challenges and risks related thereto were 
specified by the EC in a special document.74 The assistance given to Greece as 
part of the first programme was associated with the Council’s decision of 10 
May 2010 concerning Greece and contained provisions aimed at eliminating 
excessive deficit75 (the decision was changed several times afterwards).
The second financial assistance programme for Greece covered funds that 
had remained from the first programme, and an additional 130 billion euro. 
These funds were intended to cover a period from 2012 until 2014. As part of 
the programme, the states of the euro area, through the EFSF, earmarked 144.7 
billion euro, while the IMF — 19.8 billion.76 As in the case of the 1st assistance 
programme, the 2nd one was also appended by a document outlining the objec-
tives of the Greek economic reforms, a list of reforms, the challenges and risks 
they posed and methods of monitoring their implementation.77 The granting of 
 72 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_
en.htm (retrieved: 27.12.2015).
 73 “IMF Reaches Staff-level Agreement with Greece on €30 Billion Stand-by Arrange-
ment,” IMF Press Release No. 10/176, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10176.htm 
(retrieved: 27.12.2015).
 74 “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece.” European Economy. Occasional 
Papers 61/May 2010.
 75 Council Decision of 10 May 2010 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and 
deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit re-
duction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2010/320/UE). Official 
Journal of the European Union L 145, 11.06.2010.
 76 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_
en.htm (retrieved: 27.12.2015).
 77 “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece.” European Economy. Oc-
casional Papers 94/March 2012.
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subsequent money tranches depended on whether Greece managed to fulfil the 
conditions contained in the agreements and the criteria defined in Council deci-
sion No 2011/734.78 The so-called Troika, that is, the EC, ECB, and IMF, moni-
tored the process. Eventually, as part of the second assistance programme (paid 
out in 5 instalments and 13 payment tranches), Greece received 130.9 billion 
euro from the EFSF and approx. 12 billion euro from the IMF.79
It is worth noting that in order to meet the objectives of the second assist-
ance programme for Greece, a decision was taken to involve private sector in-
stitutions in resolving Greece’s debt problem. Furthermore, an objective was set 
to reduce public debt by 2020 to 120% GDP. For this purpose, during the euro 
area summit on 26 October 2011, its participants “encouraged” private institu-
tions, which were in the possession of Greek bonds, to replace them with new 
ones while agreeing to a 50% “voluntary” reduction of their nominal value.80 
Eventually, the reduction was 53.5% of the nominal value. In addition, member 
states agreed to reduce the interest rates of funds lent to Greece down to a value 
of 1.5% with retrospective effect.81
Due to the political turmoil in Greece, namely early parliamentary elections 
on 25 January 2015 and the inability to elect a president by the parliament, the 
second assistance programme was extended. First, on 19 December 2014, the 
EFSF Board of Directors resolved to provide a “technical” extension of the 
programme until the end of February 2015. Next, on 27 February 2015, the Eu-
rogroup and the EFSF Board of Directors took the decision to extend the dura-
tion of the 2nd assistance programme for Greece by another four months (until 
30 June 2015).82 Despite negotiations lasting several weeks, no agreement was 
reached on the conclusion of the fifth audit to determine whether Greece has 
met all the requirements required by the second assistance programme, nor was 
a decision made to extend the programme, which would allow for the payment 
of another tranche of assistance. On 26 June, the negotiations between Greece, 
 78 Council Decision of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and 
deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduc-
tion judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (recast) (2011/734/UE). Official 
Journal of the European Union L 296, 15.11.2011. This decision has been amended a few times.
 79 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_e 
n.htm (retrieved: 27.12.2015).
 80 “Euro Summit Statement,” Brussels, 26 October 2011, p. 4. http://www.consilium.europa 
.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf (retrieved: 27.12.2015).
 81 “Eurogroup statement,” 21.02.2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/do 
cs/pressdata/en/ecofin/128075.pdf (retrieved: 27.12.2015)
 82 Third Amendment Agreement Relating to Master Financial Assistance Facility Agree-
ment between European Financial Stability Facility, the Hellenic Republic, Hellenic financial 
stability Fund and the Bank of Greece, 27 February 2015. See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attach 
ments/Third%20Amendment%20to%20Greek%20MFFA.pdf (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
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the EC, ECB, and the IMF broke down. According to the EC, fault lay solely 
with Greece.83
In this situation, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced that 
Greece would hold a referendum on 5 July 2015 on whether or not the draft 
agreement presented by the EC, ECB, and IMF on 25 June 2015 should be 
adopted. The question posed to the Greeks read: “Should the agreement plan 
submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to the Eurogroup of 25 June 2015, and comprised 
of two parts84 that make up their joint proposal, be accepted?” The turnout in 
the referendum was 62.5%, of which 61.31% opposed the conditions contained 
in the draft agreement, while 38.69% voted in favour.85
The second financial assistance package for Greece expired on 30 June 2015 
and several days following the referendum, the Greek government turned for 
assistance as part of a new programme.86 On 17 July 2015, the Council decided 
to grant Greece a short-term financial assistance package (so-called bridge loan) 
as part of the EFSM. The maximum disposable loan was 7.16 billion euro, the 
maximum repayment period — 3 months, while the loan was to be disbursed in 
two instalments. Its objective was to enable Greece to settle the debts it owed 
to the ECB and the IMF before being granted assistance as part of a new, long-
term financial aid package from the ESM.87
An agreement on the third financial assistance programme for Greece was 
reached on 14 August 2015 and was formally accepted on 19 August 2015.88 
On the same day, Greece also signed an agreement with the EMS defining the 
financial conditions for receiving the loan.89 As part of the programme, Greece 
 83 “Information from the European Commission on the latest draft proposals in the context 
of negotiations with Greece.” See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5270_en.htm (re-
trieved: 28.12.2015).
 84 “Reforms for the completion of the current programme and beyond.” See http://www 
.referendum2015gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/REFORMS-FOR-COMPLETION-OF-
CURRENT-PROGRAM-1.pdf (retrieved: 28.12.2015). “Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analy-
sis for Greece.” See http://www.referendum2015gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/P.S.A.pdf 
(retrieved: 28.12.2015).
 85 See http://www.referendum2015gov.gr/en/ (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
 86 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_
en.htm (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
 87 Council of the European Union, Press release 593/15, 17.07.2015. See http://www 
.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/17-efsm-bridge-loan-greece/ (retrieved: 
28.12.2015).
 88 Memorandum of understanding between the European Commission acting on behalf of 
the European Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, Athens-
Brussels, 19 August 2015. See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_
loan_facility/pdf/01_mou_20150811_en.pdf (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
 89 Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between European Stability Mechanism and the 
Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece and Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, Athens-Luxem-
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may receive up to 86 billion euro in the years 2015—2018. A summary of the 
most important events of 2010—2015 concerning financial assistance for Greece 
is contained in Table 1.23.
Ta b l e  1.23
Key events between 2010 and 2015 
concerning the external financial aid programme for Greece
Date Event
2010.05.02 Eurogroup’s agreement for bilateral assistance for Greece as part of the 1st as-
sistance programme.
IMF’s decision to grant Greece assistance as part of a stand-by agreement in the 
amount of 26 billion SDR (ca. 30 billion euro).
2010—2011 Five audits verifying the completion by Greece of the 1st assistance programme 
conducted by the EC, ECB, and the IMF.
2012.03.14 Eurogroup’s agreement for financial assistance for Greece as part of the 2nd as-
sistance programme.
2012—2015 Five audits conducted by the EC, ECB, and the IMF verifying the completion by 
Greece of the 1st assistance programme.
2014.12.19 EFSF’s decision on the “technical” prolongation of the 2nd assistance programme 
until the end of February 2015.
2015.02.27 Eurogroup’s and EFSF’s decision on the prolongation of the 2nd assistance pro-
gramme until the end of June 2015.
2015.06.30 Failure of the Greece-EU negotiations on the fifth audit checking the fulfilment 
of the 2nd assistance programme by Greece and the end of the 2nd assistance 
programme for Greece.
2015.07.05 Referendum in Greece on the acceptance of a draft agreement presented by the 
EC, ECB, and IMF to the Eurogroup on 25.06.2015.
2015.07.08 Official request of the Greek government for financial assistance as part of a new 
programme.
2015.07.17 Decision of the Council on granting Greece short-term financial assistance.
2015.08.14 Political agreement of the Eurogroup on starting the 3rd assistance programme 
for Greece.
2015.08.19 Signing by Greece and the EC of an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) 
on the 3rd financial assistance programme for Greece.
2015.08.19 Signing by Greece of an agreement with the ESM regulating the conditions of 
financial assistance (Financial Assistance Facility Agreement).
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_
loan_facility/index_en.htm (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
bourg, 19 August 2015. See http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/2015-08-19%20GR%20-%20ESM% 
20-%20FFA%20publication%20version.pdf (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
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In fulfilling the bailout conditions of the aforementioned programmes (and 
also the recommendations of EU institutions concerning excessive deficit, pro-
cedures for macroeconomic imbalance or the European Semester), Greece im-
plemented a wide range of economic reforms. It is impossible to list all of them 
or to provide a precise description and analysis of each reform. It is certainly 
worth mentioning some of them to outline the scale and nature of the introduced 
changes.
As far as the tax system is concerned, the more essential changes include 
the following. One of the first decisions taken once Greece’s economic issues 
surfaced was increasing the base VAT rate from 19% to 23% and the reduced 
VAT rates from 9% to 11% and from 4.5% to 5.5%. Inheritance and gifts taxes 
were also increased.90 In 2010, a new system with nine PIT rates was introduced, 
replacing four, and the highest rate increased to 45% from 40%. Corporate in-
come tax (CIT) was decreased from 25% in 2009 and 24% in 2010 to 20% in 
2011. In 2010, excise tax for alcohol and cigarettes was also increased.91 In 2011, 
a new solidarity tax was introduced for natural persons for their 2010—2014 
incomes (1% for incomes exceeding 12,000 euro to 4% for incomes exceeding 
100,000 euro and 5% for high-ranking government officials). The tax-free al-
lowance was reduced in 2011 from 12,000 euro to 5,000 euro. From 2011, the 
reduced VAT rate was increased: from 11% to 13% and from 5.5% to 6.5%. VAT 
tax for non-alcoholic beverages and restaurant services increased from 13% to 
23%. Excise tax for electricity and natural gas was introduced.92
In 2012, the personal income tax underwent reform again. Eight rates 
(10%—45%), in which all taxpayers (workers, pensioners, self-employed, ren-
tiers) were treated equally, were replaced with three rates (22%—42%) and the 
taxpayers were differentiated depending on their source of income (e.g. loan 
institution management members, board members, entrepreneurs, persons pro-
viding so-called professional services, rentiers gaining income from real-estate 
or bonds). The tax-free allowance system was replaced with tax deductions. The 
government pulled out from previously introduced CIT reductions and the tax 
was raised to 26% (from 20%); excise tax for alcohol, cigarettes, and petrol was 
also increased.93
In 2013, a new property tax was introduced, which replaced the one in effect 
at that time. Its amount depended on, for example, the location, age, and purpose 
of the property. An additional tax was levied on properties worth more than 
300,000 euro. VAT for some restaurant and catering services was reduced from 
 90 “Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member States 2010.” European Econ-
omy 6/2010, p. 40.
 91 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2011.” European Economy 5/2011, p. 41.
 92 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2012.” European Economy 6/2012, p. 39.
 93 “Tax Reforms In EU Member States 2013.” European Economy 5/2013, p. 31.
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23% to 13%.94 Apart from changes in the tax system introduced in 2009—2011, 
some other changes included95:
• a new wage matrix was introduced in the public sector, which was supposed 
to, at least in the short-run, help significantly reduce the global wage-related 
expenses and made the compensation system in public services more trans-
parent;
• the highest pensions were reduced, pension taxes were reformed as were the 
retiring allowances;
• actions were taken to curb abuse of disability pensions (in order to reduce the 
share of disability pensions in relation to retirement pensions) and retirement 
pensions that were paid to certain professional groups on different conditions 
than to others;
• excessive employment in the public sector was reduced;
• income taxation was extended (e.g. by reducing the tax-free allowance);
• a social fund was established (the Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund), which was responsible for the privatisation of state property. Its main 
purpose was the reduction of government expenses, improvement of the per-
formance of companies and attraction of foreign capital. According to plans, 
property worth 50 billion euro was to be privatised;
• a series of health-care reforms were introduced to improve its performance 
and reduce expenses earmarked for this sector;
• a central institution was created (Single Public Procurement Authority) re-
sponsible for public tenders in order to limit violations of EU law in this 
respect and decrease expensive delays;
• labour market reforms were introduced to increase its flexibility, improve 
the competitiveness of the particular sectors of the economy and reduce un-
employment. These included the abolishment of restrictions and barriers to 
regulated professions;
• changes were introduced in transportation to reduce obstacles to its function-
ing and development, as well as to reduce costs;
• reforms in the functioning of the judicial system were introduced in order to 
reduce the backlog of court cases and improve court proceedings;
• reforms of the higher education system were introduced.
The reforms listed above proved to be highly insufficient in contributing 
to any substantial improvement to Greece’s economic conditions, that is, allow 
for a reduction of the deficit of public finances, stop the growth of public debt, 
get out of recession or reduce unemployment. They shared one common fea-
ture, namely that any positive and substantial results of the reforms would only 
 94 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States. 2014.” European Economy 6/2014, p. 33.
 95 “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fifth Review — October 2011.” Eu-
ropean Economy. Occasional Papers 87/2011, pp. 23—24, 32, 34—39.
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be visible at least several years after their introduction. Proof that the Greek 
economic reforms of 2009—2011 were insufficient are presented in section 1.2 
— statistical data, and that in 2012 Greece had to utilize the second assistance 
programme, whose maximum value was higher than that of the first one (Table 
1.22).
As a result, in the years 2012—2015, economic reforms were continued. As 
mentioned before, an agreement could not be reached between Greece and the 
Troika as to the conclusion of the fourth audit on the fulfilment of the second 
financial assistance for Greece. According to the report prepared by the EC, the 
ECB, and the IMF of 2014 concerning the fourth audit96:
• Greece continued privatisation of its state property and companies (sports bet-
ting and lottery operator, gas supply companies, railway service companies, 
regional airports) and prepared to carry out more privatisation (e.g. airports 
in the Piraeus and Thessaloniki, in Athens and such companies as Hellenic 
Petroleum and Hellenic Post). At the same time, the amount of proceeds ex-
pected by 2010 from the privatisation process was reduced to 22.3 billion 
euro;
• as mentioned earlier, tax system reforms, which for instance simplified and 
increased tax proceeds, were continued. One of the reforms included the in-
troduction of the income tax code, the tax procedures code and a unified 
property tax;
• legal regulations on accounting were reformed;
• the fight with corruption was continued;
• public finance and tender reforms were continued;
• public sector employment reductions were carried on — in 2009, the head-
count was 907 thousand, while in 2014 — 651 thousand;97
• reforms were still being carried out of the systems of healthcare, health insur-
ance, pensions and education (elementary, high school, and university level);
• in 2013, a stress-test of the Greek banking system was completed to check 
how banks would handle different economic and financial fluctuations;
• reforms of the labour market were still underway (wage setting, employment 
protection, working time) — increasing their flexibility helped reduce labour 
costs;
• restrictions hampering competition in construction materials production, food 
processing, retail, and tourism sectors were reduced or eliminated;
• reforms aiming to simplify conducting business were continued;
 96 “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fifth Review — April 2014.” 
European Economy. Occasional Papers 192, April 2014, pp. 26—63.
 97 Ibidem, p. 38.
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• actions were taken to liberalise access to regulated professions such as law-
yers, engineers, architects, geologists, land surveyors, electricians, TV techni-
cians;
• justice system reforms to improve Greek economic competitiveness were con-
tinued;
• reforms in the energy and transportation markets (privatisation, liberalisation) 
were continued.
As the data in section 1.3 shows, the assistance programmes delivered by 
Greece in cooperation with the EU and the IMF, as well as the reforms the coun-
try introduced have so far only produced limited results. From 2013, Greece 
was able to reduce the public finances sector deficit, however, the country is 
still subject to the excessive deficit procedure. It was also possible to limit the 
growth of public debt, but it is still very high despite the mentioned 50% write-
off of debt owed to private institutions. The interest rate of bonds issued by 
the Greek government is currently lower than in 2011—2012, but still clearly 
higher compared to other EU states. Greece managed to return to the financial 
markets — in April 2014, for the first time since 2010, Greece sold its 5-year 
bonds (value of 3 billion euro) with an annual rate of return of 4.75.98 In 2014, 
for the first time in many years, a positive economic growth rate was noted in 
Greece (though still very low — 0.7%), the unemployment rate fell, albeit very 
little, by 1% compared to 2013, and there was a clear decrease of the current 
account deficit. The competitiveness of the Greek economy is much worse than 
before the crisis, though in some terms, there has been some improvement in 
recent years. Greek long-term ratings are still very low.
According to, for example, Hans-Werner Sinn, the financial assistance 
Greece received “did not solve anything. On the contrary, it slowed Greece 
down in regaining its economic competitiveness. […] The money Greece re-
ceived was not used to reform its economy but to maintain status quo.” Accord-
ing to the economist, a discussion will be started in several years on the need 
to prepare another assistance programme for Greece.99
It is noted that the IMF itself has expressed doubts as to the assumptions of 
the financial assistance programmes for Greece. In 2013, in an internal docu-
ment marked as strictly confidential, the IMF was to admit that it took for 
granted the negative effects the austerity schemes would have on Greece, which 
eventually drew the state into recession. The document also mentions that the 
IMF bent its rules so that it would be possible to grant Greece assistance and 
concluded that the assumptions on the political possibilities of introducing the 
reforms and of Greece’s return to the financial markets were too optimistic. 
 98 m. KaCzmarCzyK: “Grecja wychodzi na prostą.” Gazeta Wyborcza of 11.04.2014, p. 16.
 99 “Źle się dzieje w państwie europejskim.” Interview with Hans-Werner sinn. Gazeta 
Wyborcza of 2—3.01.2016, p. 22.
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At the same time, the document also claims that the IMF did not have any other 
choice at that time (i.e. when it was being decided to grant Greece assistance as 
part of the first programme).100
Spain. The assistance programme for Spain was used to recapitalise finan-
cial institutions (mostly banks) operating in the country. Out of the 100 billion 
euro bailout, Spain only used 41.4 billion, of which 38.9 went to recapitalise 
banks, while ca. 2.5 billion went to finance a special company, which took over 
the so-called problematic assets of the assisted banks, namely the Management 
Company for Asset Arising from the Banking Sector Reorganisation (Sareb).101
As the programme was intended to help financial institutions, the condi-
tions it imposed were mainly designed for reforming this sector. According to 
the document that accompanied the agreement on granting Spain assistance, its 
main objectives were as follows: identification of banks requiring assistance, 
their recapitalisation and restructuring, transfer of a selected portion of assets 
of the assisted banks to the newly formed company (Sareb).102 The cited docu-
ment also contained a detailed action plan (with deadlines) to achieve the listed 
objectives and providing for EU institutional oversight over their realisation. 
EC’s 2014 evaluation on the Spain’s use of the assistance programme was posi-
tive and the objectives contained in the Memorandum of Understanding were 
deemed to have been achieved. Spain managed o stabilise its banking sector, 
restore confidence in it (deposits increased, stock exchange share prices rose, 
foreign capital began pouring in again, interest rates fell). The liquidity of banks 
was evaluated as “comfortable” thanks to their recapitalisation, transfer of as-
sets to Sareb and the profits achieved in 2013.103 The reforms introduced mainly 
served the purpose of recapitalising and restructuring of banks, strengthening 
their transparency as well as providing for better regulation and oversight of the 
financial sector.104 As part of the programme, changes were also made to the 
financial assets tax law.105
The latest macroeconomic data was, according to the EC, encouraging and 
gave hope for Spain’s return to economic stability. On the other hand, the EC 
 100 m. sTevis, i. TaLLey: “IMF Concedes It Made Mistakes on Greece.” The Wall Street 
Journal of 5.06.2013. See http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873242991045785272027
81667088 (retrieved: 2.01.2016).
 101 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/spain/index_en.htm (re-
trieved: 26.12.2015).
 102 “Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality,” 20 July 
2012, p. 3. See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-07-20-spain-mou_
en.pdf
 103 “Financial Assistance Programme for Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in Spain, 
Fifth Review — Winter 2014,” European Economy. Occasional Papers 170, January 2014, 
pp. 6—8.
 104 Ibidem, pp. 21—24.
 105 Ibidem, p. 16.
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pointed out that the financial sector reforms should be continued also after the 
assistance programme ceases. Spain was also told to continue its “fiscal con-
solidation” and structural reforms in order to reduce the public sector debt and 
the public debt.106
In accordance with article 14 of the resolution on the economic and bud-
getary supervision over EU states,107 once the assistance programme ends, the 
beneficiary state remains under supervision until it repays at least 75% of the 
money it received (this period may be extended by the Council at the Commis-
sion’s request). The key facts on Spain’s assistance programme are presented in 
Table 1.24.
Ta b l e  1.24
Spain’s financial assistance programme, 2012—2015 key events
Date Event
2012.06.25 Spain officially requests assistance for the financial institutions operating in the 
country.
2012.07.10 The Eurogroup consents to qualify Spain for a financial assistance programme
2012.07.20 Agreement on financial assistance for Spain to recapitalise its financial institu-
tions up to a maximum amount of 100 billion euro. 
2012.11.28 The European Commission accepts public assistance for Spain for the following 
banks: BFA/Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc, and Banco de Valencia
2012.12.20 The European Commission accepts public assistance for Spain for the following 
banks: Liberbank, Caja3, Banco Mare Nostrum, and Banco CEISS.
2012—2013 Five audits conducted by the EC and the ECB checking performance of the fi-
nancial assistance programme for financial institutions.
2014—2015 Four EC and ECB missions to Spain as part of an assistance programme review. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/spain 
/index_en.htm (retrieved: 26.12.2015).
Apart from the reforms resulting from the fulfilment of obligations relating 
to the receipt and realisation of the assistance programme for the financial sec-
tor, Spain has introduced reforms in many other areas of the economy and social 
life since 2010. These reforms have been imposed by EU law (in particular: the 
stability and growth pact, macroeconomic imbalance procedure, the European 
Semester) and binding recommendations of EU institutions (mainly of the EC) 
as well as the decisions and actions of Spain’s government, which has been at-
tempting to overcome the effects of the crisis and the clear deterioration of the 
 106 Ibidem, pp. 6—8.
 107 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro 
area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 140, 27.05.2013.
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state’s economic situation as indicated in section 1.3. Generally speaking, these 
reforms have three main goals: improvement of the situation of Spain’s central 
budget, fiscal consolidation, improvement of Spain’s economic competitiveness, 
financial stability, and bank recapitalisation.108 They focus on six main areas: 
growth of the economy and of competitiveness, regulation (state’s interference 
in the economy) and competition, the labour market, financial system, fiscal 
policy, public administration, and social security.109
A far as the tax system is concerned, two additional income tax thresholds 
were introduced in 2011 for people with incomes over 120,000 euro (44%) and 
175,000 euro (45%). Starting in 2012, the base VAT rate increased from 18% to 
21%, the reduced VAT rate increased from 8% to 10%, while some goods and 
services, which had been covered by the reduced rate, were charged with the 
base tax rate. That same year, different detailed changes concerning the cor-
porate tax were introduced to increase its effectiveness. Excise tax for tobacco 
and diesel used for commercial purposes was increased. In the years 2012 and 
2013, capital income was taxed using three rates: from 21% to 27% (in 2011, 
there were two rates — 19% and 21%).110 In 2013, a 20% tax was introduced 
for lottery wins (from 2,500 euro upwards).111 Excise tax was also increased for 
alcohol (except for wine and beer) and tobacco products.112
Apart from changes in the tax system, according to data provided by the 
Spanish government,113 the following reforms were introduced in the years 
2011—2015:
• legal regulations implemented on the constitutional level establishing a mech-
anism providing for control over the budgetary deficit and establishment of 
a competent institution (the Independent Fiscal Responsibility Authority);
• legal changes to limit tax and employment-related fraud;
• the financial relations between the central government and local authorities 
were reformed and the transparency between them was improved;
• public administration was reformed (payment system in the public sector, 
reduction of public institutions — national, regional, and local, promotion of 
 108 r. Xifré: “Four years of economic policy reforms in Spain: An analysis of results from 
an EU perspective.” Spanish Economic and Financial Outlook, vol. 3, no. 5, September 2014, 
p. 5.
 109 v. burGueTe: “Spain’s response to EC and OECD economic policy recommendations.” 
Spanish Reform Policy Brief, no. 1, November 2014. See http://www.spanishreforms.com/docu 
ments/10180/73362/Policy+Brief+N.1+November+2014.+Burguete%2C%20V./602901e8-827d-4c 
5b-bf54-5d1478344c81 (retrieved: 28.12.2015).
 110 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2012.” European Economy 6/2012, p. 43.
 111 “Tax Reforms In EU Member States 2013.” European Economy 5/2013, p. 37.
 112 “Tax Reforms In EU Member States 2014.” European Economy 6/2014, p. 41.
 113 “Balance of government. The legislature of recovery. Reforms and results 2011—2015.” 
See http://www.thespanisheconomy.com/stfls/tse/ficheros/2014/201115_Balance2011_2015.pdf 
(retrieved: 28.12.2015).
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e-administration, new legal framework for the functioning of public adminis-
tration) to achieve savings;
• tax regulations were modified (changes in personal income taxes and taxes 
paid by corporations);
• amendment of the legal regulations on the bankruptcy of individuals and com-
panies and protection of persons with mortgage loans;
• introduction of reforms to increase access to financing for small and medium 
enterprises, self-employed and Spanish start-ups;
• introduction of labour market and employment reforms to increase its flexibil-
ity and worker mobility. Introduction of programmes promoting employment, 
professional activation, and acquisition of professional qualifications, support 
for people seeking jobs, people who have been unemployed for extended peri-
ods of time, support in finding employment for various social groups, imple-
mentation of regulations helping to fight illegal employment, etc.;
• introduction of financial incentives (e.g. tax and social insurance allowance) 
for employers in order to increase employment;
• introduction of reforms to facilitate conducting business activity;
• introduction of reforms concerning persons performing regulated professions 
(legal professions or pharmacists) involving, for example, elimination of com-
pensation limits (except for notary publics) and rendering the regulations on 
the advertisement of these services more flexible114;
• as part of structural reforms introduced to improve the competitiveness of 
Spain’s economy, reforms were implemented that encompassed the sectors 
of energy, environmental protection, the property market, infrastructure and 
transportation (e.g. investments developing the transportation infrastructure), 
telecommunications, reforms increasing support for science and research and 
development, agriculture, industry, services, tourism and education;
• introduction of reforms in retail (concerning e.g. opening hours, minimum 
number of days off, permits required to open a shop)115;
• reform of regulations on the company bankruptcy procedure (shortening of 
procedure duration, reduced procedural costs)116;
• reform of the social security system (healthcare, disability and retirement pen-
sions, counteracting social exclusion);
• reform of the financing system of political parties and strengthening of politi-
cal party financing oversight;
• reform of the penal code to facilitate the battle with fraud and corruption.
 114 “Market Reforms at Work: in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.” European Economy 
5/2014, pp. 29—30.
 115 Ibidem.
 116 Ibidem.
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Italy. As shown by the data contained in section 1.3, the economic crisis in 
Italy was much less severe than in Spain, not to mention Greece. Italy did not 
have to ask for external financial assistance. The reforms introduced to mitigate 
the consequences of the crisis were the result of regulations adopted on the 
EU level (SGP, macroeconomic imbalance procedure, European Semester) and 
Italy’s understanding of the need to implement reforms. The reforms introduced 
had a much broader reach than in Greece and Spain. Their aim was to create 
better conditions for economic development, new jobs, and improve the com-
petitiveness of Italy’s economy.
Concerning the tax system, in 2012 Italy increased its excise tax for fuel 
used in transportation and introduced a tax for selected financial transactions 
(sales of shares and derivatives) in the amount of 0.12 and 0.22 depending on 
their type.117 In 2013, the income tax for low-income persons and for start-up 
investors or tourism operators investing in the modernisation of their business 
was decreased, measures were introduced allowing for the lowering of CIT for 
companies operating in selected sectors and which are in a defined financial 
situation (e.g. arts, cinemas, modernisation of tourism, investments in machines 
and equipment) and the basic VAT rate was increased to 22%, while the tax for 
some products was decreased.118
Other key reforms introduced in Italy after 2012 included119:
• within the scope of the labour market: in order to encourage employment, for 
instance, establishment of the National Employment Agency managing the 
employment policy, strengthening of the public-private partnership, introduc-
tion of a division of powers between institutions at the state and local level 
concerning the labour market, consolidation of the unemployment benefits 
system in order to increase employment;
• introduction of regulations making the labour market more flexible, for exam-
ple, in fixed-term employment contracts, employers had to justify a termina-
tion if it was made 3 years after the worker was hired, previously it was after 
1 year. Liberalisation of regulations on the maximum number of people who 
can be employed on limited-time contracts in companies hiring a specified 
number of people; reduction of redundancy protection;
• actions were taken to increase competitiveness on the market of services 
provided by persons performing regulated professions (e.g. legal professions, 
pharmacists) involving the abolition of minimum rates, introducing more flex-
 117 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2013.” European Economy 5/2013, p. 33.
 118 “Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2014.” European Economy 6/2014, p. 35.
 119 “Italy. Structural Reforms: Impact on Growth and Employment.” OECD. February 2015, 
pp. 8—10. See http://www.oecd.org/italy/structural-reforms-in-italy-impact-on-growth-and-emp 
loyment.pdf; “Market Reforms at Work: in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece,” European Econ-
omy 5/2014, pp. 22—26.
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ible regulations on teaching candidates for these professions, on establishing 
businesses, and on the advertising of services;
• introduction of reforms of the particular markets and sectors of the economy 
improving their effectiveness by strengthening anti-trust agency competen-
cies, creation of a new institution responsible for regulating the transporta-
tion infrastructure, introduction of regulations permitting non-discriminatory 
access to the telecommunications infrastructure by all operators, continued 
liberalisation of the natural gas supply market, reduced limitations on access 
to selected types of services, reduced restrictions on retail (e.g. shop opening 
hours, the minimum distances between shops) deregulation of the retail fuel 
sales market;
• introduction of reforms of the company bankruptcy procedure law;
• introduction of administrative reforms (e.g. to accelerate payment of dues 
owed to companies by administrative institutions to improve their fluidity) 
and of the justice system to decrease their operating costs and improve their 
efficiency, shorten the length of court proceedings (reorganisation of judicial 
areas to reduce workload and accelerate proceedings, reform of the mediation 
procedure).
The reforms were thought to increase economic growth by 3.4% after 
5 years and 6.3% after 10 years. They were also supposed to help reduce public 
debt in relation to the GDP.120
1.5 Conclusions
The presented data and indicators prove that the crisis had a significant im-
pact on economies and societies. The effects were most pronounced in Greece 
and Spain, slightly less in Italy. This becomes apparent when considering iso-
lated information on each of the particular states and when we compare them 
to other countries, not only those belonging to the EU. For example, a com-
parison of 42 states of the world against a synthetic indicator121 shows us that 
in 2007—2012, these states showed the highest scale of economic change.122 
 120 “Italy. Structural Reforms…,” pp. 3—7.
 121 This indicator was created by compiling five different types of data: GDP per capita in 
USD at basic prices from 2005, the unemployment rate, capitalisation of listed companies ex-
pressed in US dollars at current prices, the value of exports of goods and services in US dollars 
at basic prices from 2005, and value of net foreign direct investment inflow expressed in USD 
at basic prices. m. DziKowsKa, m. Gorynia, b. JanKowsKa: “Globalny kryzys gospodarczy — 
próba pomiaru efektów dla poszczególnych krajów.” Ekonomista 2015, no. 6, pp. 744—748.
 122 Ibidem, pp. 752, 755.
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The statistical data collected in this part of the work correlates with the results 
of this research.
The causes of the economic downturn in Greece, Spain, and Italy vary. The 
economic problems that occurred around these states, that is, the crisis in the 
USA, its transfer to Europe and the specifics of a state’s functioning in a mon-
etary union, were all conducive to the emergence and consolidation of a series 
of tensions, imbalances and irregularities within these states. The specifics of 
the Greek political system, for example, “democratic populism” and clientelism 
in the functioning of political parties and the political culture in the state123 
combined with unfavourable external circumstances, pushed Greece into a very 
difficult economic and political situation. This was made worse by the weak-
ness of public administration, difficulties in controlling public expenditure and 
poor tax collection.124 As a result, the public debt that had accumulated over the 
years had de facto led to Greece’s bankruptcy, which the state had de jure been 
saved from announcing thanks to external assistance, and a reduction of part 
of its debt. As shown by the previously mentioned case of the IMF, the activity 
and influence of international organisations on the development of events in 
Greece was far from perfect. In turn, the main reason behind Spain’s problems 
was excessive development of the construction and property sectors, severe im-
balance and burst of the speculative bubble on these markets. This is directly 
evidenced by changes in the supply, demand, and prices in the construction and 
real-estate market, and indirectly by changes, for example, to the net credit de-
mand in the private sector, private debt, domestic debt, and the current account 
balance over a period of several years before and after the crisis. In Italy, the 
crisis was markedly less severe, however, it revealed a series of weaknesses in 
the Italian economy.
The consequences of the crisis in all the three states were similar, although 
they all demonstrated various degrees of severity. All three states experienced 
recession, increased public and private debt, public finances sector deficit, gov-
ernment debt security yields, unemployment, decreased ratings, domestic in-
come levels and a decline of wealth compared to other EU states. The actions 
taken (both individually by the state governments and those “imposed” by the 
EU and the IMF) to battle the crisis produced varying results. Despite three 
external assistance programmes, partial debt reduction and several years of re-
forms, Greece’s situation is still very difficult. It was not until 2014 that Greece 
was able to achieve minimal economic growth, however, in 2015, it was in the 
red again; in 2014, the public finance sector deficit clearly fell, only to increase 
 123 s. vasiLoPouLou, D. haLiKioPouLou, T. eXaDaKTyLos: “Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Pop-
ulism, and the Politics of Blame.” Journal of Common Market Studies 2014, vol. 52, no. 2, 
pp. 389—391.
 124 K. feaThersTone: “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in 
a Skewed Regime.” Journal of Common Market Studies 2011, vol. 49, no. 2, p. 195.
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again significantly in 2015. The profitability of Greek debt securities decreased 
substantially and the country managed to return to the financial markets. Nev-
ertheless, the situation deteriorated again in 2015 when the country noted an 
increase in borrowing costs. At the same time, the Greek public debt issue is 
rather “frozen” than solved, with unemployment at high, albeit stable, levels, 
while the reforms being implemented by Greece as a condition for receiving 
external assistance, are encountering very strong political resistance.
Spain utilised one external assistance programme, and of the 100 billion 
euro allocated, it used only 41.4 billion. To receive the loan Spain had to commit 
to a reform of the banking sector and, as it appears, this assistance was effective, 
that is, it helped rectify the banking sector in Spain. Apart from banking sector 
reforms, the Spanish government also undertook a series of reforms in other 
areas of the economy, the results of which are already visible. In 2014—2015, 
it was possible to achieve economic growth and a surplus in the current ac-
count balance. The public finance sector deficit fell and so did private debt. 
The profitability of long-term state debt securities is lower than a few years ago, 
while rating agencies have increased their credibility ratings for Spain. There is 
a certain improvement visible in Spain’s economic competitiveness assessments, 
which may be attributed to the introduced reforms. At the same time, Spain is 
still subject to the excessive deficit procedure, while the unemployment rate is 
still at a very high rate of over 20%.
In Italy, the scale of the problems is much less pronounced than in Greece 
or even in Spain, and the country did not have to request any external assist-
ance. The economic collapse in Italy was not as violent as in the other two 
states. Its unemployment rate is half of theirs, whereas in 2013, the EU Council 
stated that Italy is no longer in a state of excessive public sector deficit. On 
the other hand, Italy has struggled with economic recession for several years, 
its public debt increased to over 130% GDP and the competitiveness of its 
economy is rather low.
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